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ABSTRACT
Balanced Biosocial Theory for the Social Sciences
by
Michael A . Restivo
Dr. David Dickens, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Sociology
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Evolutionary theory is the unquestioned paradigm for all biological sciences and is
gaining acceptance in many o f the social sciences, predominantly psychology and
anthropology. Sociology, as a discipline, has failed to embrace evolutionary theory and
remains uninformed about the most powerfid scientific theory o f living things: the theory
o f evolution by Darwinian selection. Traditional sociological theory is based largely on
em pirically questionable ideas about human development, behavior, and psychology, and
often contradicts fundamental knowledge about evolution. As such, it often fails to
contribute to a coherent and progressive corpus o f sociological knowledge. Biosocial
theories present a compelling alternative to the standard social science model. They
provide an empirical account for human behavior by drawing on research from the
biological sciences. I propose the fbUowing research as a conceptual 6amework for
biosocial theories in the social sciences, explaining how they might be successftdly
incorporated into sociological thought

111

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

T.4BLE OF CONTENTS
A BSTRA C T........................................................................................................................... ÜÎ
ACKNO W LEDG M ENTS.......................................................................................................v
CHAPTER 1
SCIENCE AND SOCIOLOGY.................................................................1
Social Science..................................................................................................................... 4
The Importance o f Theory.................................................................................................. 6
Defending Science.............................................................................................................. 8
Unification.........................................................................................................................11
Biophobia.......................................................................................................................... 14
CHAPTER 2
EVO LUTIO N A RY THEORY................................................................ 20
Natural Selection.............................................................................................................. 20
Phenotype and Genotype.................................................................................................. 21
Chromosomes, Genes, and Alleles.................................................................................. 23
The Synthetic Theory o f Evolution.................................................................................. 24
Adaptations....................................................................................................................... 25
Proximate and Ultim ate Causes....................................................................................... 26
How Genes Influence Behavior....................................................................................... 27
Common Misconceptions o f Evolutionary Biology........................................................30
CHAPTER 3
SOCIOBIOLOGY....................................................................................38
Human Sociobiology........................................................................................................ 45
Human Behavioral Ecology..............................................................................................49
Evolutionary Psychology.................................................................................................. 53
Memetics........................................................................................................................... 57
Gene-Culture Coevolutionary Theory..............................................................................61
CHAPTER 4
BIOSOCIAL THEORY...........................................................................65
Why Context Matters........................................................................................................70
The Sociological Connection............................................................................................71
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................................76
V IT A ....................................................................................................................................... 86

IV

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I owe a debt o f gratitude to all the people who provided me w ith support and guidance
through the process o f conducting and vmting this research. Thank you.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 1

SCIENCE AND SOOOLOGY
If, as professional sociologists, we agree that the goal o f our discipline is to
understand social behavior through the systematic study o f humans in their collective
aspect, then I believe sociology has been slow to realize this goal. Its slow progress is, in
part, due to sociology's incoherency. As a discipline, it operates w ith m ultiple, and
oftentimes contradictory, conceptual hameworks. As such it is unable to integrate all its
research projects into a unified corpus o f knowledge.
Sociology's three grand approaches to studying society and social behavior—
scientiEc, interpretive, and historical— have yielded insightfW yet only partial answers to
questions that lie at the heart o f the discipline. Each provides a different perspective,
which consist o f assumptions about ways o f thinking about the world, a preferred means
o f conceptualizing the objects o f inquiry, and seeking answers to those questions that can
be adequately addressed by that perspechve. These perspectives are practiced as though
they are mutually exclusive, but in actuality their content domains overlap. The
theoretical challenge for sociology lies in creating an integrative approach, one that
incorporates the strengths o f these different approaches by taking into account the
historical, causal, and meaningfiil dimensions o f a social phenomenon.
1 believe it is interactionist sociology, and particularly symbolic interactionism,
dramaturgy, ethnomethodology, and postmodern interactionism, as research programmes,
that have been most resistant to an integrative approach. The trend in interactionism in
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the last thirty years has been toward increasing separation vis-a-\is other approaches in
sociology, a contradistinction to the intention o f the early interpretive sociologists. One
need only look at how contemporary interactionism differs from the aim o f Weberiein
sociology to see this difference. Though the foundations for interactionism were laid over
a century ago by pragmatist philosophy, in the years since Peirce, Mead, and Dewey,
interactionist sociologists have made few theoretical contributions that are significant
outside o f their perspective and to the discipline o f sociology as a whole. Contemporary
interactionism has progressed, if at all, in merely the collecting o f lim ited, fragmented,
and partial descriptions o f phenomena.
Interactionism, as a perspective, relies on several assumptions about the social world:
'th at humans have always existed within society, that society is the source o f our qualities
as a species (for example, conscience, language, mind, self), and that it is the source of
our qualities as individuals (interests, values, talents, ideas, and so on)" (Charon
2001:17). In recent years, these assumptions have been challenged by scientists working
in the discipline o f sociobiology. They have question the notion that it is society alone
that shapes our self, our brain, our mind, our capacity for language and communication,
our values, talents, and ideas. Rather, sociobiology posits that it is our biological nature as
a species that provides a framework by which individuals organize their surroundings.
W ith the arrival o f sociobiology, the stakes for an integrative approach become
greater. Sociology must now consider insights from the biological sciences as w ell as the
approaches o f its own discipline. Interactionist sociology can occupy a crucial domain in
terms o f level o f analysis. The contents o f its study, in effect, lie at the boundaries o f all
other levels o f analysis for social behavior, connecting individuals to social structures on
the grander scale and to biology on the smaller. Interactionism is the glue that can hold a
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comprehensive social science explanation together. It can, and must, carry out this
important function if we are to better explain and understand human behavior. But
interactionist research has become more curiosity than systematic study. Precisely at the
time when a perspective that can integrate approaches is needed, interactionism has
retreated from the promise o f providing causal and meaningfiil adequacy. It has lim ited
itself with several theoretical weaknesses. Interactionism now posits the inherent
inapplicability o f one context to another and unquestionably assumes the importance o f
every interaction. By its own admission, interactionism tries to foster understanding o f a
phenomenon but can really o fk r no guidance as to its meaning outside the unique
context. How can we as sociologists reconcile the two? One answer being popularized is
that we cannot. The advent o f postmodern influences on interactionism forsakes any
concern o f how to better understand the social world. It has failed to contribute
improvements o f any consequence, and rather has m ystifed and obfuscated the entire
ordeal.
Recalling Peirce, I implore that we need to rescue the good ship sociology for the
service o f science iGrom the lawless rovers o f the sea o f interactionism. There is no better
indication o f success than progress, and those scientiGc disciplines that have shown a
clear progression o f knowledge are beneBting at sociology's expense. No longer can
sociology claim that a particular phenomenon falls on 'our tu rf and hence our
explanations are good enough. Biology has suggested ways to fn d better answers, and the
time has come for sociology to revise its theories so as to consider what biology can teach
us. An integrative approach that reaches across disciplinary borders and adopts new
theories, concepts, and practices, w ill once again unite sociology w ith the corpus o f
scientifc knowledge.
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But these are merely position statements, not arguments. In this research, I w ill review
the case for practicing sociology as a science, outline the major theoretical and
methodological underpinnings o f evolutionary theory and its approaches to studying
social behavior, assess the limited attempts o f traditional sociology to incorporate the
relevant theories and findings 6om the biological sciences, and finally, suggest a way for
interactionist sociology to cooperate with the dominant' biological-science paradigm o f
evolutionary theory.

Social Science
Although it has recently become the 'postmodern' 6shion to declare science either
dead on arrival or irrelevant to an understanding o f our own species, twenty years ago
the vast m^ority of social and behavioral scientists took it for granted that the
development of a true science o f human behavior, society, and culture was the Holy
Grail toward which they were striving. (Cronk 1999:42)

Science has been one o f the most successful ways o f acquiring knowledge. It is the
activity that the scientific community takes part in because it is perceived as having a
successful method for seeking and arriving at useful knowledge about the physical world.
"What makes a held a science is not found in the way it collects its basic data but rather
in the way in which it phrases questions, tests them, and makes claims about new
knowledge" (Cronk 1999:51). Science relies on empirical observations, logical induction,
the hypothetico-deductive method, and in using these it aims to develop theories that are
able to explain and predict occurrences in the physical world.

1 I can already anticipate a Neo-Marxist-inspired criticism of my use of the word "dominant,"
attacking evolutionary theory as "bourgeois hegemony" oppressing "emancipatory" science; or a
feminist-inspired criticism that condemns "dominant" as a metaphor for masculine-bias and
subjugation o f a "woman's way of knowing"; or a postmodem-inspired criticism of my use of the
word "dominant" as a demonstration that evolutionary theory is accepted over other theories
(which can be more-or-less "true") only by social and political negotiation. (Notice the scare
quotes.)
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In sociology's short history as an academic discipline, sociologists have variously
embraced two contradictory models for how sociology should be conducted, either as a
science or as an anti-scientihc discipline. The early influential sociologists a ll promoted
sociology as a science o f the social world. More recently, some sociologists, most often
associated with interpretive sociology, argue that the scientific model is inappropriate and
wrong for sociology. They promote an alternative purpose for sociology, one that aims
not for discovering deterministic or probabihstic laws, but for understanding motivation
and meaning h-om the perspective o f the individual.
Dualistic thinking characterizes much sociology, and these alternative conceptions o f
sociology are often thought to be opposed to one another. There is room in sociology for
both, and indeed the content o f sociological research w ill be richer by incorporating the
two. In this research, I am mainly emphasizing new ways for sociology to be practiced in
the scientiEc model, but I w ill modestly propose some ways for the two approaches to be
reconciled. A biosocial approach to sociology, the topic o f this research, is one that goes
beyond the traditional sociological focus o f looking only to social phenomena in order to
explain social behavior. It accepts that the knowledge produced by other scientific
disciplines can be relevant to understanding our social behavior, and as such, it
incorporates those theories and concepts that are relevant into its explanations. Biosocial
^proaches are still the domain o f the social sciences; the biological discipline o f
sociobiology, in contrast, "has a more ambitious agenda, [as] it concerns itself with the
behavior of all animals, has a grand theory (evolutionary theory), and it seeks ultimate
causes" (Walsh 1995:1). It is a scientific discipline within the held o f evolutionary
biology that seeks to imcover the biological basis for social behavior. For our purposes in
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the social sciences, sociobiology is a discipline that we can leam from, not one that we
must stand in contrast to.

The Importance ofTheoiy
It is almost obligatory for any research about science to talk about Kuhn's
j'trwctwrg

(1970). One diK culty o f this work lies in the

numerous and imprecise uses o f the term paradigm. A t the narrowest sense, a paradigm is
a piece o f technical equipment or a set o f exemplars in scientific achievement. In its
widest sense, a paradigm is the entire theoretical, methodological, ethical,
epistemological, and ontological worldview o f science. A third sense o f the paradigm is
the sociological community o f science, including research and educational institutions.
When we speak o f a paradigm in science or a paradigm far sociology, we must first
dehne what this means.
Ritzer uses a narrow definition o f paradigm to mean the sociological organization that
"serves to differentiate one scientihc community (or subcommunity) from another"
(1975:6). He goes on to explain that "paradigms can, in a sense, co-exist w ithin a given
science . . . multiple paradigms co-exist within contemporary sociology, but they do not
co-exist peacefully" (p. 12). This dehnition is useful in the sense o f demarcation, but tells
us little about content o f a scientiGc paradigm.
It is more useful to use paradigm to mean the conceptual Gamework that a scientiGc
community assumes and works as a part of. That is to say, scientiGc research, theory, or
pracGces w ill make sense only in relaGon to the conceptual Gamework under which it
exists.^ The conceptual Gamework o f sociology is one that can best be called pre2 Other terms that have been used to mean nearly the same thing are worldview (Weltanschauung),
categorical scheme, or framework.
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scientiGc in that it is only snccessGil at "amassing a wealth o f data on a variety o f topics
because they do not have a clear idea o f what is important" (Cronk 1999:46). How is this
a hindrance to the social sciences? Imagine if chemistry today was practiced the the same
way as sociology. Anthropologist Henry Harpending speculates:
We would spend a lot of money measuring anything measurable about substances and
materials around us. With modem computers, we would create a huge database; with
modem software, we would make any patterns readily ^parent. We would discover,
for example, a correlation between "conducts electricity" and "shininess." In the jargon
we would say that "shininess" is a determinant o f conducting electricity. Another group
would find that "density" is also a determinant o f conducting electricity. Papers would
appear discussing whether density is a determinant of shinmess or shininess of density.
None of this would get us close to the periodic table or anywhere near modem
chemistry. Meanwhile policy experts would advocate polishing household machinery to
make it shinier and thus more eScient. Universities would be plagued with workshops
on shining things up. (Harpending 1995:100)

A paradigm gives scienGsts a framework o f Gmdamental theones and exemplary
examples o f appGcaGons o f theory and research; it identiGes accepted accomplishments
and points to important quesGons that ean be solved by Grrther research; and it provides
researchers w ith methods and standards for Gnding soluGons. The paradigms in sociology
do not serve this GmcGon for pracGcing sociologists. Some sociologists argne to the
contrary, that adopting a scientiGc paradigm wiU prohibit sociology Gom conducting
research that is relevant to soeiology, and henee, this is not a model soeiology should
follow . Others recognize the value o f a coherent conceptual Gamework, but argue that
sociology's paradigmaGc state is Gne, and sociological theory is adequate in its own nght.
It only appears lim ited because sociology is in its disciplinary infancy, and just needs to
be progressively developed and intemaGy connected.
There are sociologists, however, who do believe that sociology's failure to become a
progressive, high-consensus science stems Gom its pre-paradigmatie state. Price laments
that "Sociology lacks a common set o f eoncepts, has very few veriGed proposiGons, and
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is totally devoid o f systemaGeally tested theory" (1969:iii). Sociology's strength lies in its
comprehensive collecGon o f historically Actual infbrmaGon and methodology o f data
collecGon; its weakness lies in its dearth o f adequate concepts and theories.

Defending Science
What makes a Geld a science is not found in the way it collects its basic data but rather
in the way in which it phrases questions, tests them, and makes claims about new
knowledge. (Cronk 1999:51)

This, some criGcs assert, is the myth o f science. They argue that science as a
discipline relies on a Gawed methodology for learning about the world, and that science
maintains a lim ited perspecGve on the nature o f reality . It ehallenges the assumpGon o f of
science that there is a natural world 'out there' that can be objecGvely explained.
Peiree said a century ago that "a man must be downright crazy to doubt that science
has made many true discovenes" (193 lb : 106). Yet there are many— ^pracGGoners o f the
sGong programme in the sociology o f science— ^who have these doubts. They regard
science as a myth-making enterprise, as a whoGy social endeavor, one that has no
recourse to the physical world because reality is itself a soeial construcGon— "the
construcGvist asserGon that sci enG Gct hem se lve s were socially constructed"
(Segerstrâle 2000:4).^ For example, Collins stated that the "natural world has a small or
non-existent role in the construcGon o f scientiGc knowledge" (1981:3). A more moderate
version o f the sGong programme in the sociology o f science has "come to view scienGGc
knowledge as a social construcGon rather than a product o f pure cogniGon or descripGon.
.. ScientiGc knowledge is a product o f social worA, a (fzscw.rrt;g accomplishment"
(ResGvo 1994:21, itaUcs in onginal). What makes this moderate is that it maintains a

3 "Constructivism" and "social constructionism" are used synonymously.

8
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posiüon o f ontological realism. Nonetheless, both versions o f the strong programme
dispute the the epistemological claims o f science.
Other soeiologists o f science analyze scienee as an instituGon that is guided by certain
soeial norms, and is influenced and influences other social instituGons. This is the socalled Mertonian paradigm. It acknowledges that there are both social forces and
immanent forces in the development o f science. Social forces are those factors that shape
science as an rnsGtuGon and describe how the insGtuGon works, \\dGle immanent forces
are the inner logic that explains how and why seienGGc ideas emerge (ResGvo 1994;
Segerstrâle 2000). For a Mertonian analysis o f scienee, scienGGe knowledge is placed in a
black-box outside the scope o f inquiry and outside the inGuence o f social forces.
A sigiGGcant number o f criGcisms o f science have emerged based on standpoint
epistemologies. These challenge that posiGvist, post-posiGvist, and other modem
concepGons o f epistemology are male-biased or Eurocentric (see AlcoG" and Potter 1993).
One soluGon, for example, is the development o f a "femiinst epistemology [that] consists
o f theones o f knowledge created

women,

women's modes o f know ing,/or the

purpose o f GberaGng women" (Koertge 1996:413, italics in onginal). Others eontend that
all scienee is paradigm-bound and hence can only offer different, not better, explanaGons
for phenomena. These cnGeisms are themselves all subject to the ereeping o f
epistemological relaGvism. On grounds o f this drawback and the deGciency o f being able
to formulate cogent altemaGve epistemologies, Koertge eoncludes that cnGes "Gnd their
substanGve claims unpersuasive" (1996:414). Haack (1994; 1998), Radcliffe Richards
(1996), Sommers (1994), and others offer sound criGques o f this contemporary version o f
the oA-raised philosophical issue o f epistemological perspecGvism.
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A popular tact is for criGcs to use these a&remenGoned criGcisms as a summary
criGque o f scientists as naively parGcipaGng in an epistemologically, em pirically, and
methodologically Gawed enterprise. Steven Weinberg, winner o f a Nobel Prize for
physics, rejects this idea, noting that
sociologists and histonans sometinies write as if scienGsts had not learned anything
about the scienGGc method since the days o f Francis Bacon, while of course we know
very weU how complicated the relaGon is between theory and expenment, and how
much the work of science depends on appropnate social and economic setGngs.

(2003:217)

When this summary criGcism o f science fails, criGcs may tout, seemingly as a last
resort, the failures o f the project o f posiGvism as evidence that sociology should rely on
altemaGve models for acqinring knowledge. But by doing this, many contemporary criGcs
o f science sound as if they just discovered the Grst h alf o f the twenGeth century, and hope
nobody else noGced. The grand ambiGon o f logical posiGvism was done in by Duhem,
Quine, WiGgenstein and others before any social scienGst began cnticizing it as an
invalid model for knowledge.
It is pertinent for us to be aware o f the criticisms and limitaGons o f science, and the
consequent relevance to our pracGce o f sociology. Indeed, these are aG cromulent
reGecGons on epistemological and ontological issues in science. Accordingly, a
sigiGGcant number o f sociologists are wary in one o f the manners ouGined above o f
pracGcing sociology as a science. We should be & m iliar w ith these criGcisms and how
scienGsts and philosophers respond (see Gross and LeviG 1994; Gross, Levitt, and Lewis
1996; Parsons 2003; SegersGâle 2000). Although mine is not the place to present an indepth defense o f science Gom its criGcs, I believe that the project o f sociology should
continue to be the scienGGc study o f the social world. Steven Cole provides us with a
pragmatic reason to not abandon this project. In terms o f scienGGc knowledge, that is, the
10
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cogniGve content that a scientific commnnity accepts, criGcs " h a v e r o give a .ymgZe
wAere tAe socW j7rocej^se.y z/^weMce tAe coMie/ztof snch a discovery" (1996:280,
emphasis added)/ I f this indeed is the case, as Cole's review o f the contemporary science
criGcism literature indicates, then truly "ours is an age in which parGal truths are tirelessly
Gansfbrmed into total Glsehoods and then acclaimed as revoluGonary revelaGons" (Szasz
1973:23-24). Because this research is about the content o f a scientiGc discipline as it can
apply to sociology, and our scientiGc knowledge, while not immune to cnGcism
nonetheless remains for now on secure ground, we can be safe in our decision to leave
these debates behind and to move on.

UniGcaGon
What is wrong is that sociology is incoherent. . . While each article/book/course may
be well crafted, they have litüe to do with each other. They may share methods and
even data sets . . . but each is about a unique problem with a unique set of variables.
(Davis 2001:99)

One o f the assumpGons o f science is the uiGGcaGon o f knowledge. The concept o f
uniGcaGon commonly goes by the name reducGonism, and science is oGen cnGcized for
championing a reducGonist role for science. But the term reducGon in the philosophy o f
science is oGen used to mean diGerent things. In its sGongest meaiGng, also called m icroreducGon, the speciGc goal is to be able to, in principle, use a unique lowest level o f
analysis (particle physics) in order to explain any higher-level phenomenon (like
psychology), even though "it would nevertheless be hopelessly impracGcal to try to denve
the behavior o f a single human being direcGy Gom his consGtuGon in terms o f elementary
parGcles" (Oppenheim and Putnam 1998:269). W hile some scienGsts and philosophers

4 Cole goes on to say: "A Gequently used construcGvist rhetoncal trick is to argue that it is
impossible to separate the technical Gom the social; that all science is inherently social. This turns
their entire argument into a tautology" (1996:280).

11
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have advocated this, most philosophers o f science advocate the more modest use o f
reducGon, sometimes called hierarchical reducGonism: to accept that di% rent disciplines
w in concenGate on diGerent levels o f analysis o f a phenomenon, but where the levels o f
analysis meet or overlap, the disciplines should use the same concepts.
This second, more modest type o f reducGon approaches the meaning o f uniGcaGon.
Because o f the many ways in which the term reducGon is used, the use o f the term
uiuGcaGon is preGrred for the sake o f clarity and disGncGveness. Even then, uniGcaGon
often goes by diGerent names. Cosmides, Tooby, and Barkow refer to uniGcaGon as
verGcal iutegraGon, "the principle that the various disciplines w ithin the behavioral and
social sciences should make themselves mutually consistent, and consistent with what is
known in the natural sciences as w ell" (1992:4). WGson calls this consihence, "a beGef in
the unity o f the sciences" (1998:4). Steven Pinker champions a type o f reducGon that
leads to uniGcaGon, and despite the terminological confusion, gives an example that
succincGy demonstrates the virtues o f uniGcaGon: mountains are just sand and dirt, but a
physics or chemistry alone cannot e^glain the geography o f Europe (Radkoff 2002).
The appeal o f unGying the natural and social sciences is that it would allow
explanaGons o f social behavior on many levels o f analysis to be em pirically consistent
with one another. I f a theory is suppoGed by hypotheses on mulGple levels o f
organizaGon, it is a more successful contribuGon to scientiGc knowledge. Ultim ately, this
would be beneGcial to both sociology and biology.
Consider the prospects tor sociology. This science is now in the natural history stage of
its development. There have been attempts at system building but, just as in
psychology, they were premature and came to little. Much of what passes for theory in
sociology today is really labeling of phenomena and concepts, in the expected manner
of natural history. Process is difficult to analyze because the fundamental units are
elusive, perhaps nonexistent. (Wilson 1975:574)

12
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Sociology would gain access to a corpus o f empirically-justiGed knowledge, methods
o f conducting research, and novel theories & r studying behavior. The exchange o f
disciplinary knowledge is a two-way street, and sociology would have much to offer
biology as w ell. "Just as modem biology must take chemistry into account if it is to have
any claim to completeness, so the behavioral sciences must take evolution into account G
they are to deserve being called sciences. Yet just as there is much in modem biology that
is not explained by a knowledge o f chemistry alone, there is much in the behavioral
sciences that goes beyond the analytic and interpretive power o f sociobiology" (Barash
1982:6). One contribuGon that sociology would have for biology is its perspecGve o f
interacGonism, which is the best available perspecGve for studying and understanding that
cmcial contextual component o f the environment variable.
In spite o f the potenGal beneGts to both disciplines, an uneasy boundary is maintained
by many social scienGsts between their Geld and the biological sciences. Maintaining
these disciplinary boundaries serves two funcGons. The Grst is that prevents taking on the
inherent diKculGes o f combining disciplines, which would entail organizaGonal and
social chaGenges on the part o f the insGtuGons involved. This is an argument about the
way science funcGons as a social insGtuGon, not about the content o f the scientiGc
discipline. But arGGcially maintaining boundaries because o f social organizaGon can
detrimentaGy affect the development and progression o f scienGGc knowledge. WGson
(1982) descnbes the creaGve tension between disciplines and anGdiscipGnes^ that
ultim ately causes the advancement o f both. One o f the proponents for a biosocial
5 The term anGdiscipline is troublesome because its ostensible meaning is oppoggtf to a gcigMti/zc
(fzaczpZing. The true meaning of the term as Wilson uses it, however, is agoznat a z/wczp/me. He
explains that it refers to "studies of adjacent levels of organizaGon" (1982:29) where the pracGces
and theories of an established discipline at one level of analysis come up against a newly
developing discipline (the anGdiscipline) Gom a higher or lower level of analysis. Eventually, these
two become complementary in their explanations of their adjacent levels of organizaGon.
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approach in the social sciences, the criminologist Anthony Walsh, is keenly aware o f this,
explaining that "complex social phenomena can be more

understood if their

explanations maintain consistency with what we know about the more elementary units"
(1995:3, italics in original). Such consistency can only come at the expense o f signiGcant
reorganizaGon in the way the social sciences are pracGced.
The second function o f maintaiiGng disciplinary boundaries is potenGally more
Goubling. It aUows for the development o f theones that conGict w ith those Gom other
disciplines. Research o f this sort can occur urGntenGonally, because the methodology o f
one discipline is generally not suited to analyzing the concepts Gom another, leading to
empincaGy inadequate theorizing. But maintaining that two disciplines are incompaGble
can also be used as an intenGonal way to promote theones that otherwise would be
empiricaGy indefensible. Such use o f science would be nearly indistinguishable Gom
ideology and thus is anGtheGcal to the idea o f the uniGcaGon. Requiring interdiscipGnary
consistency and exposing research to such review wiG only improve theones, methods,
and findings.

Biophobia
Nearly all o f the classical social theonsts considered the role o f biology in then
theones. Knowledge Gom the biological sciences has progressed sigiGGcanGy since the
fbundaGons o f sociology were laid, but attempts to incorporate biology into contemporary
sociology have met with increasing hosGGty. Two years after the release o f Edward O.
WGson's

in the midst o f the sociobiology debate, sociologist Gerhard

Lenski opined that sociology's
longstanding opposition to efforts to take biological factors into account in tbe study of
buman social systems bas become an albatross. I f we persist in ignoring, or worse yet,
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denying the powerful influence of geneGc and biochemical factors, we jeopardize
sociology's credibility in the scientiGc community. Environmentalist arguments that
may have been persuasive in the 1920s and 1930s no longer wash, and the longer we
persist in propounding them, the more we harm our discipline and reduce its potential.
(1977:73)'

In the nearly thirty years since, sociology's animosity toward the biological sciences
has grown greater as evolnhonary biology has made inroads into research areas
GadiGonally thought to be sociology's domain. This short history o f progress in
evoluGonary biology makes Lenski's remark seem prophetic.
Social constructivism enshrines culture as the central concept to be used to explain
human social behavior. "Culture is a thing swf generG which can be explained only in
terms o f its e lf' (Lowie 1917:25, italics in original). Durkheim, one o f the founding
6thers o f sociology, also favored only social explanaGons for social behavior: "The
determining cause o f a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it
and not among the states o f individual consciousness" (1895a: 110). Stretching the logic
o f this posiGon, the anthropologist C lifford Geertz claims that "our ideas, our values, our
acts, even our emoGons, are, like our nervous system itself, cultural products— products
manufactured, indeed, out o f tendencies, capaciGes, and disposiGons with which we were
bom, but manufactured nonetheless" (1973:50). Taken further to its logical exGeme, it is
the tenuous posiGon o f postmodern construcGvism.^ As such, this implies several beliefs
about the limitaGons o f evoluGonary biology's contribuGons to studying culture. Our
evoluGoaary past, it is argued, has no relevance for our current condiGon. Human
behavior arises and is shaped largely by culture, and culture is not influenced by our
evoluGonary past but instead is best accounted for by cultural explanaGons (Cartwright

6 See Hacking ( 1999) for clariGcaGon and analysis of the constructivist position. See also Haack
(1998) on the quesGon of science as a social construcGon, and Sokal and Bncmont (1998) on
postmodernism and science.
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2000; Rose and Rose 2000). EvoluGonary biologists expGciGy reject these limitaGons,
arguing instead that our evoluGonary past does play a role in shaping our social behavior
and hence our current cultural condiGons. As such, there must be a signiGcant biological
component that influences the development o f culture.
There seem to be some intellectual obstacles to incorporating biological concepts and
theones into sociology. EGis (1996) suggests one common-sense reason: social scienGsts
generaUy lack training in and knowledge o f biology. So many aGempts to import biology
into the social sciences have been riddled with inaccurate use o f biological concepts that a
basic understanding o f biology should be a prerequisite. Acquiring this knowledge
requGes 6m iGanzing oneseG with material outside the domain o f traditional sociology.
Consequendy, many social scienGsts are content to remain unacquainted with biology, or
the more pernicious, to use biology with no proGciency.
Van den Berghe (1978) suggests a number o f addiGonal reasons why sociology
remains hosGle toward biology, which I wiG bneGy outline here. First is the social
sciences resistance to reducGonism and uniGcaGon within science. Confusion due to the
many meanings o f reducGon in science (see above) does not help the matter, but
sociology has an addiGonal reason to reject reducGonism. Sociology has a long-standing
tradiGon o f reifying the group. SocieGes are made o f individual actors, but socieGes,
cultures, social structures, groups, and networks o f individuals are thought to be a
separate reality and the preferred level o f analysis for sociology. This thinking can be
traced back, in part, to Durkheim, who famously argued for social-level explanaGons o f
social phenomena: "every time that a social phenomenon is dGecGy explained by a
psychological phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanaGon is false" (Durkheim
1895b: 129). The reasoiGng Durkheim employs immediately pGor to making this
16
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pronouncement is not so famously remembered: "In a word, there is between psychology
and sociology the same break in continuity as between biology and the physicochemical
sciences" (p. 129). This conclusion— ^anecessary break in continuity between levels o f
analysis— ^has proved to be false not only for biology but for all the natural sciences.
WGson (1982) points out that drawing a conclusion by this reasoning is as likely to be
wrong for sociology as weG. That social organizaGon is an emergent charactensGc o f
individuals interacting is not in quesGon. But whether this consGtutes a separate reality
that operates independenüy o f the forces o f lower-level phenomena is unproven and
doubtfW. Biology focuses on the lowest possible level o f organizaGon for social behavior,
whereas sociology focuses on the highest As such, they represent opposite approaches to
studying social phenomena, and ideally these two levels o f analysis should be
complementary rather than antagoiGsGc.
DualisGc thinking also characterizes much research in the social sciences. Because
sociologists tend to favor social construcGvist models, they oAen view biology as
geneGcaGy determinist The reasoning becomes that sociology should not incorporate
biology because it is anathema to sociological reasoning. EvoluGonary theory, however,
emphasizes the interacGon between organisms and environments, favoring neither
inGuence in its explanaGons. Whether it is caGed environment, nurture, social learning, or
most-broadly culture, it is only h alf o f the equaGon. Sociology should not reject the other
half.
"Perhaps the most common ground far rejecting a biological approach to human
behavior is the presumably unique self-consciousness o f human beings . . . Because
humans are self-conscious organisms, it is argued, then behavior is m przMcip/e not
comparable to that o f other animals" (van der Berghe 1978:37-8, itahcs in o n ginal). For
17
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interpretive sociologists who beheve behavior is conscious, meaningful, and moGvated,
the phenomenon o f consciousness is a limitaGon that in principle is grounds for rejecGng
biology. However, because evoluGon shaped the development o f human consciousness,
and consciousness is structured, ordered, and influenced by biological forces, these
consideraGons would seem to nullify the argument that phenomena resulting Gom
conscious human behavior is outside the scope o f biological study. "Our mind structures
our expenence, but the structures used have been laid down duGng the evoluGon o f the
species" (Cartwnght 2000:18).
Other sociologists reject that consciousness plays a signiGcant role in social
phenomena, but nonetheless also reject biology for the reason o f the uniqueness o f human
consciousness. It is paradoxical in this case because for these sociologists, the social
world is a reality fwz

which sim ilarly favors ignoring conscious moGvaGon.

Biological forces can, as surely as social forces, shape patterns in the social world
independent o f human consciousness.
One addiGonal issue related to consciousness continues to be an impediment to
biological thinking. It is the growing trend in interacGonist sociology to focus attenGon on
verbal instead o f nonverbal behavior. It is true that we give accounts o f our moGves,
intenGons, and the meanings for our acGons, but in spite o f this, we sGÜ act in parGcular
ways. Verbal behavior can lead us to misunderstand why people act the way they do.
Pinker (2002) reteüs an example where a neurosurgeon had to sever a paGent's corpus
callosum, a brain structure that connects the two hemispheres, to eliminate the paGent's
severe seizures. A fter the successfiil surgery, the doctors had the paGent undergo some
experiments to determine the side-effects, if any. What they found was bizarre. Because
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the two hemispheres o f the brain were no longer able to commnnicate, so to speak, they
found that
if an experimenter flashes the command "W ALK" to the right hemisphere (by keeping
it in the part of the visual held that only the right hemisphere can see), the person w ill
comply with the request and begin to walk out of the room. But when the person. . . is
asked why he just got up, he will say, in all sincerity, "To get a Coke"— rather than "I
don't really know" . . . Similarly, if the patient's leA hemisphere is shown a chicken and
his right hemisphere is shown a snow&ll, and both hemispheres have to select a picture
that goes with what they see . . . the leA hemisphere picks a claw (correctly) and the
right picks a shovel (also correctly). But when the leA hemisphere is asked why the
person made those choices, it blithely says, "Oh, Aat's simple. The chicken claw goes
with the chicken, and you need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed." (Pinker
2002:43)

Unlike in this example, healthy humans walk around with their corpus callosum
intact. Nevertheless, this type o f research is helping show that there are allegedly separate
domains for action and explanation that function simultaneously in our brains. The parts
that accoimt for the conscious or verbal explanations many times may merely be
providing us with interpretations o f the actions prompted by another part o f our brain.
I f a neurological undermining o f intentionality is not aB-together convincing, keep in
mind that "perhaps the most damaging criticism [o f intentionality]. . . is the fact that each
person is not necessarily the best or sole judge o f his own intentions" (Fay 1975:74).
Sociological research, because o f the potential value o f knowing conscious intentions,
must operate with a greater naïveté, and consequently, is more susceptible to being
mislead by verbal behavior.
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CHAPTER 2

EVO LUTIO N A RY THEORY
EvoluHonaiy biology operates within the paradigm o f evolutionary theory, evolution
by natural selection. It provides the unil^ing interpretive framework for research and
theories. It also constitutes a valuable paradigm for the life sciences that stem from
biology, such as behavioral biology, populafon biology, and ethology.
Sociobiology is the discipline f-om which biosocial approaches can draw the relevant
concepts and theories. Because sociobiology is a specifc application o f evolutionary
biology, a basic understanding o f the concepts o f evolution is necessary.

Natural Selection
In the On tAg Origin q/'.^eciea^ (1859), Darwin's greatest contribution was not the
introduction o f the idea o f evolution, which had been a theory going back all the way to
the ancient Greeks (G ifispie 1960), but rather the mechanism by which evolution
operates. Darwin described this mechanism as natural selection. I w ill briefly outline the
components o f natural selection according to Darwin.
AH living things have a tendency to produce more oSspring than necessary for the
population to remain at the same size. I f this process goes unchecked, the increase in
population expands exponentially. However, over long periods o f tim e, each species'
population tends to remain stable despite this tendency to overproduce. Among sexually
reproducing species, differences exist among individuals (except for identical twins).
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Some o f the differing characteristics o f individuals are passed on to their offspring. I f the
population o f a species remains stable over time, some individuals must be more
successftd than others in producing ofkpring or some offspring are more successful at
maturing and producing their own offspring. Individuals possessing characteristics that
make them more capable o f maturing to adulthood and reproducing w ill tend to do so and
be better represented in the next generation. Natural selection is the differential
reproduction o f individuals and genes hom one generation to the next The accumulation
o f gradual changes in the genetic makeup o f a species occurs through the forces o f natural
selection constantly operating on succeeding generations. These changes are evolution
(Barash 1982; Endler 1992; Hodge 1992).

Phenotype and Genotype
To understand natural selection, it is important to understand the distinction between
an organism's phenotype and genotype. Phenotype refers to any actual, observable
characteristics— such as size, shape, structure, behavior.^ By contrast, an organism's
genotype constitutes its genetic makeup.^ The genotype is usually only discernible
through its influence on the organism's phenotype, but these concepts are distinct from
each other.
It is important to recognize that the interaction o f both genetic and environmental
characteristics determine an organism's phenotype. Neither genes alone nor
environmental factors alone can solely determine the phenotype. It is only through

7 Lewontin (1992) offers a more precise definition: "The 'phenotype' of an organism is the class of
which it is a member based upon the observable physical qualities of the organism, including its
morphology, physiology, and behavior at all levels of description" (p. 137).
8 Lewontin again: "The 'genotype' of an organism is the class of which it is a member based upon
the postulated state of its internal hereditary factors, the genes" (1992:137).
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epigenesis that a phenotype emerges. Epigenesis is "the process o f interaction between
genes and the environment that ultim ately result in the distinctive anatomical,
physiological, cognitive, and behavioral traits o f the organism" (Lumsden and Wilson
1981:370).
Conceptually separating genetic and environmental influence during epigenesis is
important to understanding how natural selection works. Imagine, for instance, identical
twins o f any species. Identical twins share the same genotype. However, imagine that in
this case, one is chronically malnourished from birth but the other receives adequate
nourishment. The diSerence in their observable characteristics— bone density, muscle
mass, height, weight, et cetera, i.e. their phenotypes— w ill in this case be the result o f
environmental and not genetic factors.
I f individuals possess characteristics (a phenotype) that enable them to produce more
successful offspring, they are said to be reproductively favored. Individuals may beneût
f-om having phenotypes that develop as a result o f fortunate environmental factors (as the
example above illustrates). Or, individuals may develop phenotypes w ith favorable
characteristics as a result o f genetic diSerences. Only the characterisfcs o f the genotype
is passed on to offspring through reproduction. Natural selecfon can only 'select' a
genotype. Recalling that evolufon is the gradual accumulation o f genetic changes within
a species, we see then that natural selection can only produce evolutionary change in a
population in which the individuals who are reproductively favored have favorable
phenotypes that are the result of genefc and not environmental factors (Barash 1982;
Endler 1992).
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Chromosomes, Genes, and Alleles
Providing definitions for some terms fo m genetics is in order. A ll o f our genes exist
in structures called chromosomes. Chromosomes are compact intertwined molecules o f
D N A found in the nucleus of cells. Chromosomes contain the cell's genetic information
or genes. Humans normally have 23 pairs o f chromosomes (46 total chromosomes), one
chromosome o f each pair inherited from each parent. The defnition o f a gene is less
clear; branches o f biology define genes diferently so as to be a usable concept in the
discipline. One definition is that each gene codes for an individual protein. An alternative
defnition is that a gene can be identified by analyzing the base-pair sequence on the
chromosome on which it resides. Others use it broadly to mean an inheritable section o f
D N A . These various definitions do not imply that a gene is an arbitrary conception, but
rather it is defned differently by biologists who are studying different aspects o f genetics.
The most basic defnition o f a gene, which subsumes all o f the ways in which other
biologists define it more precisely it in more specialized contexts, is that a gene is "a
genetic unit which is small enough to last for a large number o f generations and to be
distributed around in the form o f many copies . . . a little bit o f chromosome which
potentially lasts for many generations" (Dawkins 1976:34-5).
Because only one gene can be contained at any one position on a chromosome, any
genes that can potentially reside in the same spot are called alleles. They can be thought
to be rivals far a specific position on a chromosome (Dawkins 1976). An allele is one o f
several alternative forms o f the same gene. In a population, there can be any number o f
alleles, but only one can be present on in any individual chromosome. The gene pool,
then, can be thought o f as all the alleles present in a population.
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The Synthetic Theory o f Evolution
W hile Darwin and his contemporaries described the mechanism o f evolution, they did
so without our modem understanding o f genetics. The modem synthetic theory o f
evolution combines the mechanism o f natural selection with insights 6om the discipline
o f population genetics. Evolution involves a change in gene Hequencies in a population.
I f the 6equencies o f genes in a population remain in a statistical distribution (because
there are no &ctors which modify their Bequencies), that population's gene pool is said to
be in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium.^ In a population in such equilibrium, evolution is not
taking place. The study o f evolution, then, is the study o f the factors that disrupt HardyWeinberg equilibrium (Barash 1982). There can be an influx or outflow o f genes between
populations (immigration and emigration), resulting in new genes entering or existing
genes being removed from a population. Random mutation can also introduce new genes
and eliminate old ones. The equilibrium o f a genetic population can also be affected by
genetic drift; when breeding occurs in a small population, some o f the genetic diversity is
Tost' or underrepresented in offspring by statistical chance. Frequencies o f genes in such
a population are said to drift randomly (that is, nonadaptively) &om one generation to the
next.
The most significant 6ctor that disrupts genetic equilibrium is natural selection.
Individuals differ in their reproductive success because o f differing phenotypes. Genes
are one component that shape an individual's phenotype. Genes, then, also differ in their
reproductive success because they are transmitted by individuals during reproduction.
The fitness o f genes is a measure o f their reproductive success. Fitness is not a fixed.

9 A cornerstone of population genetics is the Hardy-Weinberg law. It explains the relationship
between frequencies of genes in a population and the various combinations of genes in individuals.
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inherent measure, but rather is relative to aU other traits which affect reproductive
success, and also relative to the environment "A trait may confer high fitness in one
environment but low fitness in another" (Barash 1982:23).

Adaptations
There are two ways in which the term adaptation is used m evolutionary biology. The
term adaptation, in the first sense, is used to mean the evolutionary process o f
"transgenerational alterations o f the features and capacities o f organisms in a lineage that
enable them to solve . . . problems posed by the environment, problems o f internal
integration, and the problem o f reproducing" (Burian 1992:7). Natural selection causes
the differential reproduction o f individuals with phenotypic advantages, producing these
changes.
A second way in which adaptation is used is to mean features o f organisms. A
characteristic o f an organism that increases its ûtness (that is, its reproductive success) is
called an adaptation. "Adaptations are phenotypic Matures (morphological structures,
physiological mechanisms, and behaviors) that are present in individual organisms
because they were favored by natural selection in the past" (Thornhill and Palmer
2000:5). An adaptation is the difference in one trait Bom another that results in increased
fitness for the individual (Clutton-Brock and Harvey 1979).
It is important to make the distinction between traits that have a high adaptive value
and adaptations. "To be considered an adaptation a trait must be shown to be a
consequence o f selection for that trait" (West-Eberhard 1992:13). A trait may have a high
adaptive value (that is, it contributes to the adaptedness o f a organism) but this these traits
may not have necessarily been selected for (Burian 1992). They may be the result o f an
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incidental "good fit between the organism and the environment" or "ability to perform a
task effectively" (West-Eberhard 1992:13). Because of a phenomenon called pleiotropy
— ^"the the tendency for genes to have multiple effects" (B arkow l989:29)— it is often
difficult to know the diSerence between an adaptation and an incidentally-useful trait.

Proximate and Ultim ate Causes
Evolutionary scientists employ two levels o f analysis in determining the cause o f
b eh avio r.T h ey speak o f proximate causation and ultimate causation." First, it should be
clear that, in this context, cause is used to mean "that without which an e fk c t or
phenomenon would not exist" (Thornhill and Palmer 2000:4). This is the scientific
conception o f cause. In seeking to determine what causes a particular behavior in an
individual, one is actually seeking the answers to a number o f separate but related
questions: What stimuli or factors ehcit such behavior? What genetic, physiological, or
psychological mechanisms influence such behavior? What :&ctors present in the
environment elicit such behavior? To answer these questions is to seek a proximate cause
o f behavior (Barash 1982). The proximate causes o f behavior are "those that operate over
the short term— ^the immediate causes o f behavior" (Thornhill and Palmer 2000:4). These
include bodily traits, like genes, hormones, and brain mechanisms, and environmental
stim uli, both psychological and social.
Evolutionary scientists also are interested in the ultimate causes o f behavior. They
would ask additional questions about what causes a particular behavior: What is the
10 Because this paper is primarily concerned with human social behavior, I w ill focus on outlining the
relevant concepts Aom evolutionary theory as they pertain to behavior. Behavior is merely one
phenotypic trait, and these concepts apply equally to all characteristics o f an organism.
11 Baldwin and Baldwin (1981 ) prefer to use the "distal" as synonym for "ultimate" because of the
misleading connotation of ultimate causation. I share their concern, but because "distal" has not
gained wide acceptance, 1 w ill use the standard terminology.
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adaptive significance o f this behavior? Was this behavior selected as a way o f increasing
reproductive Gtness? Why is this behavior similar to (or diHerent from) behaviors o f
other species faced with the similar evolutionary challenges? To answer these questions
are to seek the ultimate causes o f behavior (Barash 1982). Ultimate causes are the
explanation for why a proximate cause can occur in the 6rst place.
For evolutionary scientists, it is not sufficient to understand only the proximate causes
or ultimate causes o f behavior. The best explanation for the cause o f any behavior takes
into account both proximate and ultimate levels o f causation. Ultimate cause explains
why a proximate cause exists, and proximate causes explain immediately why a behavior
occurs.

How Genes Influence Behavior
Genetics and developmental biology are new sciences, and much needed research is
still being conducted. "Given our general ignorance o f the pathways between genes and
behavior. . . it would probably be wisest not to speak o f a gene
ggne zn/Zwcncmg tAc proAuAz/ify

a trait but rather o f a

occz/TTcnce q/^a behavioral or morphological

character" (Barkow 1989:26, italics in original). Why does biology use this speculative or
probabilistic language? The hrst is to ward o ff any notion that biology only offers
genetically deterministic explanations (see "Common Misconceptions o f Evolutionary
Biology," page 30). This language is also used because o f the ideas o f single-gene eSects
and polygenes. A single-gene effect is an instance where one gene is responsible for a
single attribute, usually with relative autonomy &om environmental influence. Research
on single-gene efkcts has tended to focus on instances where a disability, such as a
disorder like hemophilia, is linked to a single gene (Barkow 1989). Nearly all complex
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attributes o f an organism's phenotype, including behavior, are the product o f m ultiple, co
ordinated genes or 'polygenes.'
Even in the case o f polygenes, the general model for all living things holds true, that
an organism's phenotype is the product o f genes interacting with environmental factors.
Biology is, in actuality, the study o f these interactions (ThomhiU and Palmer 2000).
Because behavior is one characteristic o f a phenotype, when studying any behavior it
makes sense to study both the genetic and environmental contributions to that behavior.
"The relative contributions of genotype and environment may vary considerably, but
neither is ever equal to zero" (Barash 1982:29).
A common misunderstanding is to think that behavior is somehow contained w ithin a
gene, or a particular gene programs a certain behavior. Genotypes are merely blueprints
that, through their interaction with environmental factors, code for a range o f potential
phenotypes. Environment, in this case, is defined broadly. Anderson, an evolutionary
biologist, writes that "environment is used, as I believe it is generally used in biology, to
mean all contingencies other than genes" (1979:99). Recall that epigenesis is the process
o f interaction between the genes and the environment that results in an organism's
phenotype. Epigenesis encompasses all o f the biological processes o f an organism, "from
the moment that RNA is transcribed 6om D N A , then forward through all phases o f
development to the final assembly o f tissues and cognition itself; the interacting
environment Erst is composed entirely o f the cell medium but then expands until— in the
case o f human beings especially— it includes all aspects o f culture" (Lumsden and
W ilson 1981:370).
In some cases, the environmental influences on how a gene codes for a particular
phenotypic trait is very low, leaving little room for learning or experience. In other cases,
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the geneEc contribution can be so general as to leave almost all o f the phenotypic
development the result o f environmental factors. "Among human beings, for example, the
blink reflex is highly specified by our genetic makeup whereas personality is largely
determined by experience" (Barash 1982:30). Just like any other characterisEc o f a
phenotype, behavior can evolve by natural selecEon.
I f understanding the mechanisms by which genes influence behavior is difEculf
thinking about it Eom a developmental standpoint may o fk r a more clear perspecEve:
The DNA of which genes are composed specifies the producEon of proteins, leading to
the various structures constituting an organism. These structures include hone, muscle,
gland, and nerve cells. Behavior unquesEonably arises as a consequence of the activity
of nerve cells, which presumably are suscepEhle to speciEcaEon by DNA, just as any
other cells. Accordingly, insofar as genes specif the organizaEon of nerve cells, just as
they specify the organizaEon of bone cells, there is every reason to accept a role for
genes in producing behavior, just as we accept the role o f genes in producing structure.
As phenotypes go, behavior may be somewhat more Eexible or suscepEhle to
environmental influences than are most other phenotypes. But the relevance of geneEcs
to behavior is undeniable, and since evoluEon is the pnmary force responsible for the
geneEc makeup of living thiogs, evoluEon must also be relevant to behavior. (Barash
1982:34)

EvoluEonary biology makes clear that genes do inEuence behavior. But genes only
work at a molecular level, and behavior results Eom acEon by our muscles and nervous
system and so on. Determining Aow genes inEuence behavior is an exEaordinanly
difEcult task for gencEcists and developmental biologists who are only at the beginning
o f this quest even for simple organisms. Knowledge that genes inEuence behavior is "not
the same as knowing how that gene w ill funcEon in any o f a potenEaUy vast array o f
envEonments" (Alcock 2001:46). EvoluEonary biologists need not have all the

12 It is diSicult, even for biologists, to understand the mechanism of how genotypes affect behavioral
phenotypes; yet the held of evoluEonary biology that specializes in this area, behavior geneEcs,
has accumulated overwhelming empincal evidence demonstrating the correlaEon between genes
and behavior for a wide vanety of animal species, including humans.
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developmental details— how genomes and environments become phenotypes— ^be&re
proposing and testing hypotheses about geneEc influences on behavior.
The disEnction between knowing that genes influence behavior and knowing
precisely how or precisely which genes afkct parEcular behaviors leads into the next
section where 1 w ill address some criEcisms o f evoluEonary biology.

Common MisconcepEons o f EvoluEonary Biology

^ Geng For...
One impediment to understanding evoluEonary biology is the noEon that there are
genes for parEcular behaviors. From the preceding secEon, it is clear to see why this idea
is in error. Any behavior is actually a complex phenomenon that requires analysis on
many influencing factors, not just attnbuEon to one simplisEc cause. Nevertheless, this
has become a popular idea. A recent Popular Science arEcle claims that embryoinc stem
cell research could "tell us what each and every gene actually does" (W eed 2003). The
New York Times Magazine ran a story about a possible gene that prevents heart disease,
sEoke, and diabetes (Dominus 2004). There is an ongoing discussion about the genes for
alcohohsm, violence, musical abiUty, et cetera. The list is nearly endless, but research
supporting such ideas is often tentaEve and couched in language Eke 'supports the idea
that genes regulate' or 'suggests a geneEc basis fo r'— far Eom the determinisEc language
'a gene E r' a behavior.
The converse o f this argument, that no gene has been found to cause a parEcular
social behavior, is often used by cnEcs o f evoluEonary biology. "No one has ever been
able to relate any aspect o f human social behavior to any parEcular gene or set o f genes"
(LewonEn, Rose, and Kamin 1984:251). The mistake here is to conclude 'That an
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aAsence

evzJence on the geneEc fonndaEon o f human social behavior consEtutes

evzùknce _/br the noninvolvement o f genes in the development o f our sociality. " (Alcock
2001:52, italics in onginal). Alcock goes on to explain that "the shortage o f detailed
infbrmaEon on gene-behavior relationships arises Eom the complexity o f these
relaEonships and the resulting diEiculty in establishing which genes are doing what, and
not because genes are irrelevant when it comes to the development o f behavior" (p. 53).
I f the pomt has not been made already, then try to Eüow the logic o f the 'no gene E)r
a parEcular social behavior' argument as it might apply to a non-behavioral phenotypic
Eait. Biologists have not idenEEed which genes cause the development o f our heart and
lungs (cause, o f course, meaning to provide the hEbrmaEon that is responsible E»r the
development o f our heart and lungs). Are we then to suggest that in the absence o f these
genes our cardiopulmonary system would be the same?

'Things that are natural iu ongin should not be changed, because natural things are
good. ' This is the naturalisEc fallacy. It should be noted that this type o f reasoning is not
conEned to those studying evoluEonary biology, but rather, it is a widely-held assumpEon
by those who fancy nature but misunderstand biology. Popular examples abound, and the
naturahsEc fallacy oEen can be found lurking in the promotion o f many envEonmental
and poliEcal movements, such as Greenpeace, The Sierra Club, or the Libertarian Party
For example, Greenpeace's "goal is to ensure the ability o f the Earth to nurture life in all
its diversity." The Sierra Club büls itself as "iuspEed by nature." The Libertarian Party
promotes a governing system that stems Eom "the laws o f nature and o f nature's God."
The naturalisEc fallacy can also be found in issues related to nuEiEon and health. Arluke
13 This is not meant to be an indictment or promotion of any organizaEon.
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and Sanders (1996) provide an unexpected example; in the 1930s and 1940s, the N azi
party in Germany promoted vegetarianism as a natural way o f living.
The refutahon o f this fallacy is plain enough. In nature, "there are diseases, plagues,
parasites, in&nt m ortality, and a host o f other natural events which we try to eliminate or
reduce" (Buss 1994:16). Rarely w ill you End someone arguing that these things, because
they are in nature, ought to exist. "The search for morahty in nature has led to
sentimentalizing and romanEcizing nonhuman animals and preliterate peoples . . . Some
anthropologists im ply that anything that occurs in preliterate society— ^infanEcide,
geronEcide, w ar6re, muElaEon— ^is 'good' because it 'funcEons' to promote stabEity in a
culture, society, or ecosystem" (Symons 1979:61).
EvoluEonary biologists do not argue that we ought to accept nature, but cEEcs oEen
misinterpret the descEpEons o f what nature is like as an endorsement o f What ought to be.
"Because there is an evoluEonary ongin. . . does not mean that we must condone or
perpetuate it" (Buss 1994:17). Dawkins explains, " I am not advocating a morality based
on evoluEon. I am saying how things have evolved" (1976:3). There is a distincEon
between what we beheve ü the way things are and what we believe owgAt to be the way
things are.''* Biologists rarely commit the naturalisEc fallacy, but are often accused o f it.
GeneEc DerermznEm
Closely related to the naturalisEc fallacy is the noEon o f geneEc determinism: 'Our
genes cause us to behave in some Exed, programmed way, and thus our behavior is
natural and immutable.' It is a faüacy "to suppose that geneEcally inhented traits are by
deEniEon Exed and unmodiEable" (Dawkins 1976:3). EvoluEonary biologists sEess the
inseparable and equaüy important contnbuEons o f genes and envEonmental factors in the
14 For a philosophical treatise on this disEncEon, see Moore (1903).
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development o f all Eaits, including culturally learned behaviors. "Our genes may instruct
us [to behave certain ways]. . . but we are not necessarily compelled to obey them all our
lives" (Dawkins 1976:3). Genes on then own do nothing at all because "the infbrmaEon
they contain cannot be expressed in the absence o f many other chemicals, aU o f which are
environmentally supplied" (Alcock 2001:43). Genes influence, not determine, behavior;
sociobiology is built on this premise (Alcock 2001; WiEenbenberger 1981).
That this misconcepEon o f evoluEonary biology is so widespread is parEcularly
interesting because nearly aU researchers believe— ^and in then works go into great detail
to explain why—this idea is inaccurate. John Maynard Smith, one o f the most respected
and accomplished evoluEonary theonsts o f our time, conclusively states that geneEc
determiiEsm is "an incorrect idea that is largely irrelevant, because it is not held by
anyone, or at least not by any competent evoluEonary biologist" (Maynard-Smith
1997:524).
MMwnEgrsmnEmg f roxzmarg nzzE L/ZEmare TavgZs q/"C<3z/.ynEoM
Although nearly every major work in evoluEonary biology duly refutes geneEc
determ inism and the closely-related naturalisEc fallacy, these misconcepEons are still

held by some social scienEsts. One explanaEon is that "ultimate and proximate causaEon
EequenEy are confbunded: 'produced by natural selecEon' is equated with 'iim ate,' and
an evoluEonary view o f humans is thought, erroneously, to imply that aEempts at social
reform are doomed" (Symons 1979:59). A clariEcaEon, then, would seem to be in order.
Understanding proximate and ultimate levels o f causaEon can be Eoublesome for a
number of reasons. "Our cognitive and pereeptual mechanisms have been designed by
natural selecEon to perceive and think about events that occur in a relaEvely lim ited timespan" (Buss 1994:16). It is easy to conceptualize the proximate causes o f behavior;
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evoluEon, however, takes place gradually over many generaEons. Because we do not
experience them happening, ultimate causes o f behavior are more difEcult to grasp, and
as such they are someEmes dismissed.
Other times, ultimate causes are mistaken for proximate causes. "This is why the
explanaEon that a behavior exists because it was favored by selecEon (an ultimate
hypothesis) is oEen mistakenly seen as an altemaEve to the explanaEon that learning is
involved in the occurrence o f the behavior (a proximate hypothesis)" (ThomhiU and
Palmer 2000:111). Proximate and ulEmate levels o f explanaEon are dependent upon one
another; when a proximate-level explanation for a behavior assumes an implausible
ulEmate-level explanaEon, evoluEonary biologists can be assured that this incompaEbiUty
requires further invesEgaEon. But those who misunderstand these two levels o f causaEon
may inadvertenEy reject the need to saEsfy both proximate and ultimate levels of
causaEon, leading them to accept dubious causes E)r behavior. One such example is the
Oedipus complex proposed by Freud. "Because o f the reduced viability of offspring
produced by mating o f elose relaEves, close inbreeding is selected against. Thus, Freud
postulated as fundamental to human nature a trait that simply cannot exist" (ThomhiU and
Palmer 2000:112).
AZeoZogy
Upon this Arst, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must
desire to leam, and in so desiring not be saEsAed with what you already incline to
think, there follows one coroUary which itself deserves to be inscnbed upon every wall
of the city of philosophy: Do not block the way of inquiry. (Peirce 193 la:56)

In spite o f overwhelming and convincmg arguments by evoluEonary biologists
against the afbremenEoned misconcepEons (including both technical and lay
explanaEons), these misconcepEons are sEU held by some critics. One possible reason for
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this is because evoluEonary biology may conflict with some ideological beliefs. CriEcs
may hold these or other mistaken ideas about evoluEon not because they misunderstand
the concepts, but instead use these ideas when criEquing evoluEonary research as a means
o f undermining it for ideological reasons.
Historians o f science would point out that ideological-based cnEques have always
accompanied work in evoluEonary theory, even as early as the publication o f Darwin's
OrzgfM q/"tAg ;i^ggzg.y. Venable (1966) summarizes Engels's criEque o f natural selecEon:
"In short, far Eom supporting Marxism, this theory merely serves, if Eansferred back
Eom natural history into the society Eom which it was originally borrowed, to eternalize
and justdy as though grounded in nature itself, the barbarous economic relaEons o f the
parEcular historical epoch o f bourgeois capitalism" (p. 64).
W hile poliEcs and science oEen seem to be inseparable, it is E)r the betterment o f
both to be able to discuss each as conceptually distinct. Science has been used to ju s ti^
political ideologies, and poliEcal ideologies have at times determined the content o f
j'czg/iE.yEc research (viz. Social Darwinism and Lysenkoism )." Nonetheless, more oEen
the culprit is science's associaEon with the poliEcal ideology, not the content o f the
science. "Should we abandon the germ theory o f disease because the Nazis used it to
jusEfy then anE-SemiEsm?" (Johnson 2002:14).
When we End a scienEEc position manifestly misrepresented in order to criEcize it,
ideology may be lurking nearby. This type o f straw-man argument is evidenced here in an
arEcle in the journal S'ocmZ Text. It is a vaiiaEon on the 'gene E»r' argument, couched in
obscuranEst language:

] 5 Ruse (2000) provides a useful overview of the bistoncal misuses of evolutionary theory.
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The interaction of an organism with its own geneEc structure is only one o f the crucial
determinants of its course of development and transfbrmaEon. Its two environments—
its own species and the ecosystem of which it is a part— are intnnsic to both its
survival, growth, and transfbrmaEon. Thus, controTy to c/owszcof
both the
spaEaliiy and temporality of life fbrms is essenEally indeterminate &om the perspecEve
o f the geneEc code. (Aronowitz 1996:181, emphasis added)

But classical genetics (indeed, all o f biology) is weE-aware that genes and
environments are the two sides to the same developmental coin; in fact, the importance o f
the "two environments" is a scientiGc discovery, not a contribuEon by a social
construcEvist's commentaiy on biology. Why the blatant misuse? Two possibiliEes exist:
It was either unintentional because o f a lack o f actual knowledge o f biology. Or, it was
intenEonal in order to undermine biology for ideological reasons. The laEer is more
likely; the arEcle was Eatured in the 'Science Wars' issue o f &czaZ Tex/ in which social
construcEvists responded to the cnEcism o f Gross and LeviE's FfgAer

(see

"De&nding Science" p. 8), a book that charged "cultural studies cntiques o f science [o f
being] Eddied with iucompetence" (Boghossian 1998:23).'^
But cEEcism o f evoluEonary biology on ideological grounds can even come Eom
within the scientiEc discipline. "As working scienEsts in the Eeld o f evoluEonary
geneEcs and ecology, we have been aEempEng with some success to guide our own
research by a conscious apphcaEon o f M arxist philosophy" (Lewontin and Levins
1976:34) How to adjudicate between research and ideological belief, when they come
into conflict, seems to be clear: "There is nothing in M arx, LeiEn or Mao that is or that
can be in contradicEon with the parEcular physical :^ ts and processes o f a parEcular set
o f phenomena in the objecEve world" (p. 59). That this thinking comes Eom Richard
Lewontin, one o f the foremost authoEEes on evoluEonary biology, at Harvard University,

16 It is a telling irony that Sokal's parody (1996) was included in this issue as well.
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reminds us that ideology and science may sometimes coexist, but only uncom&rtably.
Separatiog the two may leave them both for the better.
Feminism is another example where tension can exist between ideology and science. I
w ill use the example o f the feminist biologist Tang-Martinez as illustrative o f this
conflict. Tang-Martinez rejects sociobiology, asserting that it is "neither relevant nor
necessary to understanding or ending the oppression o f women. The otjecEons raised by
Eadihonal feminists . . . are both methodological and ideological" (1997:117). She
accuses sociobiology o f being "biologically determinisEc and serves only to jusEfy and
promote the oppression o f women" (p. 117). What is accompEshed by invoking this
misconcepEon?'^ It is clear that Tang-MarEnez, a pracEcing biologist, understands the
faEaciousness o f the argument. She rejects sociobiology as biologically determinist
because it is unfavorable to feminist ideology, but she does not reject sociobiology when
its use is ideologicaEy favorable. In fact, she goes on to write that some feminist
biologists "use sociobiological methodology and analysis in an attempt to understand the
origins o f male dominaEon and female oppression. . . [so that] by understanding the
evoluEonary ongins o f male dominance, we wiE be able to formulate more effecEve
responses to counteract Emale oppression" (p. 118, itahcs in onginal). It now becomes
clear what can be accomplished by marrying science and ideology: one can accept what is
ideologicaEy beneEcial and undermine the rest that conEicts. I f femiiEsm is a poEEcal
ideology o f what ongA/ to be— that is, "the eradicaEon o f male dominance and female
oppression" (p. 119)— and evoluEonary biology a science o f W iat is, then again I argue
that separating the two may leave them both for the better.

17 The use of "biological determinism" and "genetic determinism" here are synonymous.
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CHAPTERS

SOCIOBIOLOGY
The biological theones o f human social behavior fall under the rubnc of sociobiology.
The publicaEon o f Edward O. Wilson's S'ocioAzoZogy." TAe ZView 5^/Aesis (1975) is
regarded as a watershed event, because it was WEson's book that first synthesized the
existing theoreEcal work by biologists and animal-studies by ethologists into a new
discipline for the study o f animal social behavior (M axw ell 1991). WEson's book is a
"massive summary review of the research o f other scienEsts who have employed
Darwinian evoluEonary theory to make sense o f social behavior" (Alcock 2001:16). In
5'oczoAzo/ogy, WEson accomplished a monumental scienEEc task: he was able to digest
the existing evoluEonary literature on social behavior, organize it clearly, and explain
how the existing research on social behavior made sense in Eght o f evoluEonary theory
(Alcock 2001). He also gave a label to this new Eeld o f evolutionary biology:
sociobiology. Sociobiology is, by WEson's own deEniEon, "the systemaEc study o f the
biological basis o f all social behavior" (W ilson 1975:4).
W ith the publicaEon o f 5'oczoAzo/ogy. TAe ZVew Sj/n/Acf», thus began the great
sociobiology debate that raged through much o f the 1970s and 1980s. Sociobiology was
criEcized on poliEcal grounds as reifying conservaEve values and legitim izing racism and
sexism (Lewontin, Rose, Kamin 1984). But Sociobiology was also criEcized on scientiEc
grounds as reducEonist and determinisEc. "Social scientists bitterly disputed W ilson's
claims, found faults with his methods, and dismissed his explanaEons as speculaEve
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stones" (Laland and Brown 2002:4). Balanced analysis o f the work on its scienEEc ments
was scarce. John Maynard Smith, one o f leading evoluEonary biologists at the Eme,
commented in his review o f

that Wilson made "a major contribuEon" to an

understanding o f animal behavior and careEdly reviewed its many posiEve features
(Maynard Snnth 1975:496). But Maynard Smith also pointed out that given the
misappEcation o f biological theones in the past (Eke scientiEc racism and Nazism ), one
must be very conscious o f creating a work that could foster the inappropnate uses o f
biology. His iniEal atEtude toward W ilson's book was "one o f considerable annoyance
and distress" (Segerstrale 2000:241).
It is far outside the intent o f this paper to delve into the details o f the sociobiology
debate. Complete and impaiEal Eeatments o f the parEcipants, concepts, issues, and
history— ^including both the scientiEc and poEEcal aspects o f the debate— ^have been
wriEen (see Alcock 2001; Ruse 2000; Segerstrâle 2000). For our purposes, it is enough to
know that in the scientiEc commuinty, sociobiology has become a weU-established and
widely-accepted discipline for studying arnmal social behavior. Sociobiology has done
much to outlast its criEcs and is now an estabEshed branch o f evoluEonary biology. In
fact, in 1989 the intemaEonal Anim al Behavior Society took an informal poU o f its
ofEcers and feUows. They rated W ilson's 5'ocmAmZogy as the most important book on
animal behavior o f aU Eme (Segerstrale 2000). In the Efteen years since, sociobiologists
have continued to accumulate successful research that has secured their posiEon as
pracEEoners o f a legitimate and mature scientiEc discipline.
We should be clear about what sociobiologists actually study and the type o f research
they are engaged in. Sociobiology is the study o f the evoluEonary origins o f social
behavior. It is just one branch o f evoluEonary biology, a broader Eeld concerned w ith the
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evoluEonary caztygj: o f all components o f li& — ^like physiology, psychology, anatomy,
geneEcs. Evolutionary biology, in turn, is just one branch o f the overarching science o f
biology—the study o f all living things and life processes.
When analyzing any behavior, there are really four types o f quesEons we can ask
about that behavior. We may ask: What are its immediate (or proximate) causes? In what
ways does this behavior develop over the individual's life-span? What is the funcEon o f
this behavior that caused it to be favored by natural selecEon? Finally, what is the
evoluEonary history o f this behavior, that is, what are its ultimate causes?
Asking the Erst quesEon about the proximate causes o f a behavior is really asking
about how the internal mechanisms o f an organism work. Answering this quesEon is the
domain o f cellular biology and neurophysiology. The second quesEon, about the
development o f a behavior in the individual's Efe-span, is one that developmental biology
most suitably answers. It is the third and fourth quesEons, about the funcEon and
evoluEonary history o f a behavior, that most concerns sociobiologists. "Sociobiology is
pnmanly concerned with the adapEve signiEcance o f behavior; that is, its ulEmate
causaEon, as opposed to proximate factors" (Barash 1982:45). Despite each discipEne's
abUity to explain in detaE one aspect o f a behavior, no explanaEon o f any behavior can be
complete without integrating the answers to all 6)ur types o f quesEons. The value o f
sociobiology is that, o f all the biological disciplines, it can provide answers to the
questions we deem most relevant concerning our social behavior. That is, why do humans
act the way they do? In order to End out the evoluEonary history and causes o f our
behavior, we need to understand the sociobiological way o f answering this quesEon.
One conceptual tool for understanding the evoluEonary history o f traits, including
behaviors, is taking the gene's eye view for hypothesis generaEon and testing. Dawkins
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introduced this way of reasoning in TAe &eÿzsA Gene (1976), and it has since become an
important tool in evoluEonary biology. The idea is that we should imagine the perspecEve
o f the gene, whose only desire is to propel itself (through replicaEon) into the next
generaEon o f hosts. Genes that tend to influence their hosts into doing things that aid in
their reproducEon are more successful genes. A gene is selected on one criteria: "its
average effecEveness in producing individuals able to maximize the gene's representaEon
in future generaEons" (W illiam s 1966:251). This is what Dawkins means when he
descnbes genes as being selEsh. If we think about the phenotype o f an organism (which is
caused by its genes interacting with the environment), by taking the gene's eye view we
can see that many phenotypic characteristics o f the organism funcEon to beneEt the
replicaEon o f genes. Thus we can form hypotheses about why different species evolved
the way they did by thinking about how the evoluEonary history o f the species was
beneEcial to its current geneEc makeup.
A t this point, we should take a step back and recognize that Dawkins is using gene's
eye view reasoning as a metaphoncal way o f thinking about evoluEon, not literally.
Genes may appear selfish, but they do not uc/ a;g/^A/y; whüe only one allele may secure a
place on a chromosome, this does not mean that genes are

and although

mulEplying prodigiously is one characterisEc o f a successEil unit o f repEcaEon, Dawkins
is not implying that genes have an actual

to see themselves reproduce. These are

merely terms that humans use to help explain the course o f gene evoluEon. Genes do
nothing except code for proteins that, in turn, shape the phenotype o f an organism.
VariaEons in phenotypes allow for differenEal reproducEve success, and hence, the
evoluEonary process. "The environment is the ultimate natural selector" (Barash
1982:16). What Dawkins is saying is that if we use gene's eye view reasoning,
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evoluEonary biology has a powerful tool for understanding how adaptaEons emerge and
proliferate in the evoluEonary history o f a species.
One central issue o f sociobiology is explaiinng altruism. Altruism, in biology, has a
speciEc meaning: an individual's behavior is said to be altruisEc if it increases another's
chances o f survival and reproducEon while decreasing its own chances (Alcock 2001 ;
Dawkins 1976; Laland and Brown 2002). Because behaviors that decrease the chance o f
survival o f should be selected against, the quesEon emerges: how can such behavior have
evolved? The answer is kinship, and it can best be understood by taking the gene's eye
view. Because an offspring receives half o f its genes from each parent, the geneEc
relatedness o f parent to offspring is 0.5— that is, each parent and the offspring w ill share
50 per cent o f their genes. Two siblings also have a geneEc relatedness o f 0.5 because
h alf o f each siblings genes come Eom each their mother and father.'^ The relatedness o f
other relaEves can be calculated as well: oEspring and grandparent, 0.25; two cousins,
0.125; and so on. This measure o f geneEc relatedness is the probabihty that any two
relaEves w ill possess the same gene.
The reproducEve Etness o f an organism is its ability to survive and reproduce
successfully. But if relaEves share many o f the same genes, Eom the selEsh gene's
perspecEve, reproducEve Etness should include not only the organism in which it is being
carried but also aU its relaEves that may also be carrying a copy o f the gene. The term
inclusive Etness is the idea that both the individual's reproducEve success and the
reproducEve success o f relaEves is important Eom the perspecEve o f the gene.

18 Siblings have a genetic relatedness of 0.5, but they only ftarü/ica/Zy share 50 per cent of their
genes. Due to the random assignment of genes during meiosis, siblings have an equal likelihood of
acquiring any particular gene Eom either parent. But their geneEc relatedness may actually be
greater or less due to this random acquisiEon.
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I f altruistic behavior reduces an individual's reproductive Etness at the expense o f
raising another's reproductive Etness, then in the interest o f the survival o f the gene, there
are instances where altruism is evoluEonaiily beneEcial. I f the geneEc relatedness o f two
organisms is 0.5, and one individual does an altruisEc behavior for this relaEve, then the
altruist has a 50 per cent chance that it wiU be beneEEng its own genes in the relaEve.
That is, the probabihty o f an altruisEc behavior beneEting shared genes is the same as the
measure o f geneEc relatedness. SelecEon for an altruisEc behavior wEl occur if the cost
o f acting altruisEcaUy is less than this probabihty o f beneEt to the relaEve. Or put another
way, selecEon far altruisEc behavior wEl occur vAen the probabihty o f beneEEng shared
genes outweighs the cost o f the behavior.
The idea o f altruism beneEting the genes held in common between relaEves is known
as kin selecEon. K in selecEon describes "selection that takes account o f other relaEves as
weh as immediate descendants . . . and can be generally applied to any situaEon in which
an individual behaves in apparently altruisEc ways towards closely related kin to enhance
their reproductive Etness" (Laland and Brown 2002:78). The occurrence of altruistic
behavior is conEngent upon the geneEc relatedness o f the two individuals involved, and
in addiEon to altruisEc behavior, many o f the other key concepts in sociobiology deal
with the weighing o f the costs and beneEts.
EvoluEonary game theory is another way o f thinking about behavioral patterns. A
behavioral poEcy that is governed by geneEc factors, and hence is innate or pre
programmed, is said to be a behavioral strategy. In a populaEon individuals act according
to various strategies. For example, one strategy may be 'always steal food', another might
be 'always share food', and a third might be condiEonal, 'share food w ith those who are
w illing to share in return, but attack those who try to steal food'. There are many different
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possible strategies, but over the evolutionary course o f a population, one set o f strategies
may be the most beneûcial and impenetrable by individuals employing other strategies.
Take, for example, the three strategies just mentioned. In a population o f only food
thieves, starvation would be rampant and the survival rate o f such a population would
quickly reach zero. In a population o f food sharers, everyone would benefit equally until
one food th ief migrated into the population; at this point, the thief would benefit at the
expense o f all the sharers. The thief has a greater reproductive fitness and in turn, over
passing generations, more and more members o f the population are thieves until ÊnaUy it
is a population o f all thieves and can no longer be sustained. But take the third strategy:
sharing food would beneSt the population until a th ief arrives, but as soon as the th ief is
discovered, it would be attacked and driven away. This strategy tends to encourage
sharing and discourage theft and remains stable over many generations. Such a strategy is
known as an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), and the study o f ESS is one o f the
cornerstones o f sociobiological research (Dawkins 1976; Maynard Smith 1982).
One ESS seems to be special. It is what Robert Trivers, in a 1971 paper, named
reciprocal altruism:
He suggested that, if unrelated individuals interacted over an extended period o f time,
an altruistic behaviour which was initially costly to the actor but beneficial to the
recipient could be selected if this were a high probability that the altruistic act would be
reciprocated between the two individuals on a future occasion. Over time, both
individuals would gain more than if they had not cooperated at all. (Laland and Brown

2002:83)

Because o f the possibility o f cheats, there is a difhculty to overcome before reciprocal
altruism can evolve as an ESS. It would likely occur only when the each individual can
maintain a memory o f the interaction, so that those who cheat and do not reciprocate
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would be remembered and not receive altruism in the future. The idea o f reciprocal
altruism can help explain the selection for altruistic behavior outside o f the kin relation.
W ith these conceptual tools— gene's eye view, inclusive fitness, kin selection,
evolutionary stable strategies, reciprocal altruism— sociobiology has many ways o f
explaining social behavior. The central principle o f sociobiology is that individuals w ill
tend to behave in ways that w ill be most successful in passing on copies o f their genes
into the next generation. But underlying this is the premise that, insofar as behaviors can
be shaped by evolution, it is in the environment in which those behaviors evolved that the
behaviors should allow for maximum reproductive success. (Barash 1982; W ilson 1975).
Sociobiology, then, still must take into account Ihe environmental context in which genes
and individuals operate.

Human Sociobiology
W ith the introduction o f Wilson's

researchers in evolutionary biology

had a new methodology and body o f literature to draw upon. I f sociobiology was the
systematic study o f the biological basis o f all social behavior, why should these new
methods not be applied to human social behavior? Forerunners o f this new human
sociobiology were scientists like George C. W illiam s, Robert Trivers, John Maynard
Smith, and W illiam Hamilton (Laland and Brown 2002).
In coigunction with S'ocioAmlogy, it was the work o f Richard Dawkins, an Oxford
zoologist, that lead to the explosion o f research in human sociobiology. In human
sociobiology, the most relevant question is, "W hy are people?" As incongruous as this
question sounds, it is really a way o f asking how we have come to be what we are now
and why we behave the way we do. Dawkins begins 7%e S'eZ/lfA Gene (1976) by
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pondering the answer to this question. Human sociobiology seeks to uncover the ways
humans were developed by evolution and how evolved behavioral strategies influence our
behavior.
W ilson argues "that the human species is prescribed to some extent but also displays
some genetic differences among individuals. As a consequence, human populations retain
the capacity to evolve still further in their biological capacity for social behavior"
(1978:3-4).'^ Wilson outlines the h)ur characteristics o f human sociobiology:
1. Sjoecz/zcity q/'Au/nan socW AcAnvzor. Human behavior exhibits great cultural diversity.
However, this variation comprises only a small subset o f aU o f the social behavior
variation exhibited by all species on earth.
2 f/ry/oggzzetzc rg7zzrzoMj^/zzp& Our social arrangements most closely resemble animals
with which we share a common ancestry and close genotypic relation. Since we share a
common ancestry, for our social arrangements to resemble those o f monkeys and apes
is to be expected, only " if human social behavior is still constrained to some extent by
genetic predispositions in behavioral development" (1978:4).
3. Cozz/brnzzry to joczoAzo/ogzca/ iAeo/};. I f there are genetic constraints on human
behavior, the sciences that form the foundation o f sociobiology— ^that is, population
genetics and ecology— can be applied to the explanation o f human social organization.
4. Gezzeizc vnrzzzizozz wzt/zzzi i/zg jpeczea^. Biochemical and genetic analysis has revealed
that point mutations on the human chromosome and chromosomal aberrations affect
behavior, affect mental capacity, and alter motor ability. Wilson calls attention to
Lesch-Nyhan syndrome and Turner's syndrome. "More complex forms o f human

19 The evidence supporting such a claim, Wilson argues, can be found in Chagnon and Irons (1979),
Freedman (1979), and others; a detailed analysis of the assertion, however, lies outside the scope
o f this paper.
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behavior are almost certainly under the control o f polygenes (genes scattered on many
chromosome loci), which in turn create their effects through alternating a wide array o f
mediating devices, from elementary neuronal wiring to muscular coordination and
'mental set' induced by hormone levels" (1978:5).
"M y overall conclusion 6 om the existing information," Wilson summarizes, "is that
TTbnzo fqpienf is a typical animal species with reference to the quality and magnitude o f
the genetic diversity afkcting its behavior. 1 also believe that it w ill soon be w ithin our
ability to locate and characterize specific genes that alter the more complex forms o f
social behavior" (1978:6-7).
Human sociobiology added one additional principle to these four that would aid the
research on specific mechanisms o f human behavior. It is the validity o f comparing
humans to other animal species. The logic o f such a comparison is summarized in the
following argument:
I f two species are very closely related, they have a very recent common ancestor, that
is, one that lived a few million years previously, hom which they w ill have inherited a
large number of genes. Some of the ancestral genes that both lineages have received are
likely to remain unchanged over a relatively short time, geologically speaking, and
therefore could be responsible for some of the shared attributes between the species.
Detailed similarities between two very closely related species could therefore be the
product of shared ancestry and need not have evolved zWepgWgMt/y hom diherent
genetic backgrounds. If so, we can use the similarities between these carefully selected
species to infer what traits were present in their shared ancestor, one step back in these
species' history. (Alcock 2001:75-6)

Using the tools o f sociobiology to study human behavior has been used in the past to
much success. Trivers described the conflicts between parents and offspring as a result o f
their differences in genetic relatedness (1972; 1974). By using the concepts o f kin
selection and gene's eye view, a novel approach to understanding such conflicts emerges.
(Although Trivers introduced his ideas o f parent-offspring conflict before Dawkins
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popularized the gene's eye view for hypothesis generation, in their reasoning there is
much sim ilarity between the two.) Parents would want to dole out resources and support
to their offspring in equal amounts, and save some resources for further reproductive
capability, but offspring would want to get as much resources and support from parents as
possible before having to become self-reliant. This is because, although their genetic
relatedness is the same (0.5), the offspring, by their nature o f being the forward
generation, are more concerned with their survival and reproduction. Natural selection
would favor traits in offspring that prompt them to get as much as possible &om parents,
while selection would favor traits in parents that cause them to withhold resources in an
attempt to strike a balance between current and future offspring.
Although the way parent-offspring conflict arise and functions has proved diSicult to
investigate, "Trivers's ideas provided huge impetus for further work by biologists and led
to a 6 esh interpretation o f parent-offspring interactions in humans" (Laland and Brown
2002:81). Evolutionary game theory and study o f ESS in humans also remain two
important ways o f studying human behavior with the intent o f determining how humans
attempt to maximize reproductive fitness given the environmental context. In this way,
human sociobiologists attempt to leam what the purpose o f behaviors.
For a discipline to be considered scientific, one criteria it must meet is that its theories
must be falsifiable— ^that is, shown the conditions under which the theory is considered
&lse (Popper 1965; Lakatos 1970). One criticism o f human sociobiology is that its
hypotheses are un61sifiable and are no more than story-telhng for the origin o f behavioral
traits. But sociobiologists have responded to such a charge and point out that any
"hypothesis generates various predictions . . . [and] one could in principle test [a]
hypothesis much more extensively" by submitting these predictions to further teshng
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(Alcock 2001:70). Human sociobiological research takes efforts to prevent just-so story
telling. The 6rst is to perform the vital task o f testing these additional predictions or the
consequences o f a hypothesis, for if these turn out to be inconsistent w ith the hypothesis,
it is evidence that the theory may be flawed. Human sociobiologists also rely on
comparative methods to provide support their theories. W ith a careful application o f
comparative methods, the hndings of one approach o f biology can be applied to the
hypothesis-testing o f another. Reconciling hypotheses with evidence from the fossil
record, behavior genetics, population genetics, and animal ethology increases the
likelihood that human sociobiological explanations are true and not merely plausible.

Human Behavioral Ecology
The evolutionary science o f behavioral ecology is chiefly concerned with identh^dng
the links between ecological factors and a(% )tive behaviors. Behavioral ecology assumes
the following key features: "ecological selectionist logic, a 'piecemeal' analytical
approach, a reliance on modehng, a focus on 'decision rules' or 'conditional' strategies,
and the so-called phenotypic gambit" (Smith 2000:29). Eco/ogzcaZ .yg/ecfzoMza'f Zogzc
means to seek out which environmental features, like resource density or competitor
frequency, select for a particular behavior, making predictions about such selection based
on theoretical expectations o f natural selection. It is p'feccmea/ in the sense that "complex
socioecological phenomenon are hnitfuUy studied piece by piece— ^in a reductionist rather
than hohstic fashion" (p. 29). DccMZOM

or coMz/ztzoMaZ

are ways o f

explaining how behavioral variation w ill correlate with environmental variation. Finally,
the j 7/ze/zo%)zc gaz?z6zt posits that constraints on adaptation, "be they genetic,
psychological, or social, are so minimal as to justil^ their being ignored in the
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construction o f models and the testing o f hypotheses" (Laland and Brown 2002:136).
Behavioral ecologists are not concerned whether the specific adaptations are the result o f
genes or psychological mechanisms; what matters is that if behavior is adaptive then it
can be modeled and predicted (Laland and Brown 2002; Smith 2000).
Human behavioral ecologists apply the logic and assumptions o f behavioral ecology
to studying human social behavior. In doing so, human behavioral ecologists draw several
conclusions about human social behavior:
1. Behavioral diversity is largely a result of diversity in the contemporary
socioecological environment (rather than in contemporary variation in genes or
cultural inheritance, or in past environments).
2. Adaptive relationships between behavior and environment may arise horn many
different mechanisms; hence HBE [human behavioral ecology] is generally agnostic
about mechanisms (including the question of cognitive modularity).
3. Since humans are capable of rapid adaptive shiAs in phenotype, they are likely to be
well-adapted to most features of contemporary environments, and to exhibit
relatively little adaptive lag. (Smith 2000:29)

Human behavioral ecology emphasizes the flexibility o f human behavior, and tends to
be particularly concerned with resource issues, game theory, and theories o f optim ality
(Cartwright 2000). Human beings are assumed to be able to flexibly alter their behavior
in response to environmental conditions. Humans posses the characteristic o f high
adaptability, which is the ability to "survive and successfully reproduce in a wide range o f
environments" (Laland and Brown 2002:114). Human behavioral ecologists use
mathematical models o f evolutionary theory to generate and test hypotheses about human
behavioral patterns. I f behavior is an adaptation selected to increase reproductive Gtness,
then given the environmental circumstances, models can be produced that predict what
would be optimal behavioral patterns. These models can then be compared with data 6 om
anthropological research. I f the data 6t the predicted behavior 6 om the model, the
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hypothesis provides a relatively good explanation o f the behavioral patterns, decision
making strategies, and important environmental cues that influence behavior. I f the data
do not fit the model, it can be concluded that behavioral patterns in the studied population
are not optim al to the situation.
Human behavioral ecology does not formulate theories o f adaptations but "merely
establish[es] which behaviour patterns appeared ad^tive by correlating human
behavioural traits with reproductive success" (Laland and Brown 2002:132). As such, it
does not clearly distinguish between adaptations and adaptiveness. An adaptation is a
phenotypic characteristic that is selectively favored by natural selection that, because it is
effective in solving particular environmental challenges that the organism faces, increase
reproductive success. A sim ilarly named concept, but one that is conceptually very
different, is adaptiveness. Adaptiveness is the measure o f a behavior's effect on
reproductive success. Behaviors that increase reproductive success are said to be
adaptive.
We can ask two questions about any behavior: Is the behavior an adaptation? Is the
behavior adaptive? There are 6)ur possible explanations for any behavior— ^the cross of
this two-by-two matrix o f adaptations and adaptiveness. A trivial example may help
explain this point: the human blink reflex.^" Let us assume lhat the blink reflex is an
adaptation. I f we hve in an environment where no foreign objects ever threaten to enter
the eye (an unlikely, but hypothetical, scenario), then we might conclude that this
adaptation no longer has a high degree o f adaptiveness— that is, it is no longer adaptive.
That is to say that in this special environment, the blink reflex is an adaptation but is not
20 I wish to stress that example is using the blink reflex is purely hypothetical. In no way is this meant
to be a
analysis of the blink rehex, its evolutionary origins, or current adaptiveness. It is
merely a convenient hypothetical example to use because it is familiar and helps explain the
distinction between adaptations and ad^tiveness.
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currently adaptive. We do not live in such a sanitized environment, and we can assume
that the environment in which the blink reflex was favored by natural selection as an
adaptation is in many ways similar to the environment we live in today. Thus, the blink
reflex is an adaptation and also is currently highly adaptive.
Now, let us change our minds and assume that the blink reflex is not really an
adaptation. Instead it can be considered a by-product o f another adaptation, perhaps a by
product o f the mechanism for moistening the eye. In the same scenario as mentioned
above, if we hve in an environment where nothing ever threatens to enter the eye, then in
this case the blink reflex has a low degree o f adaptiveness— ^that is, it is not adaptive. The
blink reflex, then, is not an adaptation and also is not adaptive. In the terminology o f
evolutionary biology, the blink reflex in this case is a dysfunctional by-product. But we
have already agreed that our environment is not such a sterile place. Whatever the reason
is why we blink, it is currently something that has a high degree o f adaptiveness.
Although not an adaptation, the blink reflex is adaptive. In the terminology o f
evolutionary biology, the blink reflex in this case can be thought to be an ex^tation— the
utilization o f a structure or feature for a function other than that for which it was
developed through natural selection.
This example, I hope, has made clear the distinction between adaptations and
adaptiveness. Human behavioral ecology has been criticized for assuming that aU
adaptive behaviors (that is, behaviors that increase reproductive success) are adaptations
(characteristics &vored by natural selection). Human behavioral ecologists respond by
contending that they are w ell aware o f the distinction, but such a distinction does not
factor into modeling behavior. It is precisely on this point that a group o f evolutionary
scientists split w ith the human behavioral ecology tradition and began a new
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sociobiological approach. Donald Symons (1990) summarizes the rationale for rejecting
human behavioral ecology:
Darwinism is a historical example of the origin and maintenance of odapioAoMf, and
almost none of the phenomena of interest to social scientists— polyandry, bridewealth,
the avunculate, and so forth— are themselves adaptations. Whether or not they are
adaptive, they cannot be adaptations because they are not descriptions of phenotypic
design. Darwinism can be '^p lied ' to traditional social science phenomena only
insofar as it illuminates the psychological adaptations drat underpin those phenomena.
(P .435)

Because o f these criticisms and the subsequent development o f the rival theory,
evolutionary psychology, human behavioral ecology remains a small branch o f
anthropology. "Thus, while the methods o f human behavioural ecology have the
advantage that they are quantitative, rigorous, theory-driven, and insightful," its ideas and
empirical Hndings are underrepresented in sociobiological research (Laland and Brown
2002:150).

Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary psychology has proved to be the most huitful o f aU sociobiology
theories. "In terms o f the number o f researchers, human behavioral ecology is dwarfed by
its cousin evolutionary psychology" (Laland and Brown 2002:151). Practitioners o f
evolutionary psychology argue that since that all aspects o f humans evolved by natural
selection, our brains "consist o f a set o f adaptations, designed to solve the long-standing
adaptive problems humans encountered as hunter-gatherers" (Cosmides and Tooby
1997:241). Adaptations are characteristics o f organisms which are the result o f selection
in a particular functional context (West-Eberhard 1992). Whereas human sociobiologists
and human behavioral ecologists focus their expzlanations on behavioral traits,
evolutionary psychologists focus on the adapted psychological mechanisms to explain
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proximate and ultimate causes of behavior. Two pioneers o f evolutionary psychology,
Cosmides and Tooby (1987), explain:
[I]n the rush to apply evolutionary insights to a science of human behavior, many
researchers have made a conceptual 'wrong turn,' leaving a g ^ in the evolutionary
approach that has limited effectiveness. This wrong turn has consisted o f attempting to
apply evolutionary theory directly to the level of manifest behavior, rather than using it
as a heuristic guide for the discovery of iimate psychological mechanisms. (Pp. 278-9)

The adaptations that are key for an evolutionary psychological perspective are those
that arose throughout the evolutionary history o f hominids, and especially homo sapiens.
Humans had lived in small himter-gatherer groups for around 99 per cent o f their
existence since the emergence o f Homo sapiens^^ (Badcock 2000; Cartwright 2000;
Tooby and Cosmides 1997). Natural selection acts within the environmental conditions
&ced by a species throughout its evolutionary history (Symons 1979). For humans, the
environment o f the Pleistocene era, a period o f time 6 om 1.7 m illion to around 10,000
years ago, is the environment o f evolutionary adaptedness, or EEA (Badcock 2000;
Bowlby 1969; Laland and Brown 2002; Tooby and Cosmides 1997). The properties o f
this ancestral world endured long enough to allow the alleles well-adapted to the
environment to occur and flourish at high hrequencies in the the population's gene pool.
Accrual o f these successful adaptations takes a considerable amount o f time.
Evolution by natural selection is very slow, taking place gradually and incrementally over
many hundreds o f generations, in comparison to the changes that can occur in history and
culture. In the time since the development o f agriculture around 10,000 years ago, human
culture has changed dramatically. These rapid changes leave our evolved psychological
mechanisms lagging behind the environment faced by humans in the modem era (Laland
and Brown 2002). Adaptations in humans were shaped by the features o f our ancestral
21 The first species of the genus TTbmo evolved nearly two and a half million years ago, with the
emergence of 7/b/Mo gopiew about 200,000 years ago.
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environment, and so "human psychological mechanisms should be adapted to those
environments, not necessarily to the twentieth-century industrialized w orld" (Cosmides
and Tooby 1987:201). When an adaptation that conferred reproductive fitness in one
environment decreases fitness in another, evolutionary psychology identifies these traits
as maladaptive:
The difference between current and evolutionary historical environments is especially
important to keep in mind when one is considering human behavioral adaptations.
Today most humans live in environments that have evolutionarily novel
components . . . Therefore, human behavior is sometimes poorly ad^ted (in the
evolutionary sense of the word) to current conditions. (Thornhill and Palmer 2000:7)

Evolutionary psychology operates on the assumption that "natural selection cannot
select for behavior per se; it can only select for mechanisms that produce behavior"
(Cosmides and Tooby 1987:281). Psychological mechanisms include the information
processing circuits in our brain that shape behavior, context-speciGc emotions,
preferences, and prochvities (Laland and Brown 2002). Pinker (2002) draws together
evidence from cognitive science, neuroscience, and genetics to support the principle held
by evolutionary psychology that the human mind has domain-specific processing abilities
adept at solving particular problems. Evolutionary psychologists also cite the
anthropological work (Brown 1991) on human universals— a set o f characteristics and
aptitudes that all cultures have in common— as evidence that "natural selection has
endowed humans with a universal complex mind" (Pinker 2002:55).
Evolutionary psychologists argue that evolved cognitive mechanisms, at least in part,
shape the way humans leam, reason, develop, and acquire culture (Cosmides and Tooby
1997). These evolved cognitive mechanisms are domain-specific and are designed to
process information 6 0 m each content domain with the "recurrent structure o f its
characteristic problem type, as encountered under Pleistocene conditions" (Cosmides and
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Tooby 1997:243). What this means is that our brains have been shaped by natural
selection "with a set o f 'mental modules' that give us innate skills and predispositions . . .
[like] modules for language acquisition, for face recognition, for budding basic
taxonomies o f life forms and much else" (Johnson 2002:12). Our minds have a large
number o f these mental modules that are "dedicated to finding quick and efficient
solutions to particular problems that were o f signiGcance to our ancestors" (Laland and
Brown 2002:162).
W ith an understanding o f the characteristics o f the environment o f evolutionary
adaptedness and its inherent adaptive problems, evolutionary psychologists can attempt to
determine what cognidve mechanisms evolved. This is because, in the environment o f
evolutionary adaptedness, human hunters and gatherers had to solve speciGc problems.
Thus this way o f life was "the only stable, persistent adaptadon humans have ever
achieved . . . insufficient time has elapsed since the invention o f agriculture 10,000 years
ago for signiGcant change to have occurred in human gene pools" (Symons 1979:35).
For our purposes in understanding evoluGonary psychology, Tooby and Cosmides
provide two o f its fundamental tenets: "the human mind consists o f a set o f evolved
information-processing mechanisms instantiated in the human nervous system" and
"these mechanisms, and the developmental programs that produce them, are adaptaGons,
produced by natural selecGon over evoluGonary time in ancestral environments"
(1992:24). EvoluGonary psychology seeks to uncover these mechanisms, postulate how
they developed, and how they funcGon in our modem environment. Because it is easy to
engage in armchair evoluGonary hypothesizing, evoluGonary psychologists engage in a
number o f methodological pracGces that aim to increase the validity o f their research:
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1. Use evolutionary theory as a starting-point to develop models of adaptive problems
the human psyche had to solve.
2. Attempt to determine how these adaptive problems manifested themselves in
Pleistocene conditions, and endeavour to establish the selection pressures.
3. Catalogue the specific information processing problems that must be solved if the
adaptive function is to be accomplished. Develop a computational theory.
4. Use the computational theory to determine the design features that any cognitive
program capable of solving the problem must have, and develop models of the
cognitive programme structure.
5. Eliminate alternate candidate models with experiments and field observation.
6. Compare die model against the pattens of manifest behavior that are produced by
modem conditions. (Laland and Brown 2002:164)

Indeed, Tooby and Cosmides (1989) advise ns that "the desire to leapGog directly
Gom step one to step six must be resisted if evolutionary biology is to have any enduring
impact on the social sciences" (p. 41). That some research in this Geld does not heed this
warning by its main proponents is not reason to condemn the Geld in its entirety. The best
research in evoluGonary psychology is ngorous, empincally-jusGGed, consistent with the
knowledge and theones o f related Gelds in evoluGonary biology, and provide novel ways
o f thinking about human social behavior. Laland and Brown summarize that "the
evoluGonary psychology literature has made important confribuGons to the understanding
o f culture, decision making, emoGon, language, pregnancy, psychological illness, sexual
behaviour and sex differences, sGgmaGzaGon, visual percepGon, and many other topics"
(2002:195).

MemeGcs
The history o f the sociobiological literature has demonstrated that the last chapter o f a
book can cause the most controversy, as was the case with W ilson's chapter on humans in
j5oczo6foZogy (1975, chap. 27). Richard Dawkins parGcipated in this Gend, too, when he
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inGoduced the concept o f memes as a new type o f replicators in the last chapter o f his
Gene (1976, chap. 11). Whereas the gene is the unit o f AzoZogzcaZ natural
selecGon, the meme is the unit o f cwZtwruZ natural selecGon. Dawkins idenGGes the
properGes that any successGd unit o f natural selecGon must have: longevity, fecundity,
and copying-Gdelity. Genes consGtute a secGon o f a chromosome which potentially last
for many generaGons (longevity), copy and spread rapidly (fecundity), and reproduce the
DNA infbrmaGon faithfully (copying-Gdelity).
Using the gene as an analogy, memes, according to Dawkins, "propagate themselves
in the meme pool by leaping Gom brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense,
can be called imitaGon" (1976:206). Memes are a unit o f imitaGon. "When you im itate
someone else, something is passed on. This 'something' can then be passed on again, and
again, and so take on a life o f its own" (Blackmore 1999:4). This 'something' is a meme.
I f you retell a story that a Giend told you, but don't imitate every gesture or use the exact
words, this sGll counts as imitaGon as long as the gist o f the story is copied. ReteUing the
story is imitaGon; the gist o f the story is the meme. It is the smallest sufGcienGy
distiucGve and memorable idea that can be passed on through imitaGon. Memes possess
the same properGes o f a unit o f natural selecGon that genes do. Memes GequenGy stay in
our heads for long periods o f tim e, they can be copied and spread rapidly, and the
infbrmaGon is reproduced GithfuUy^ during rephcaGon.
MemeGcists often point out that not everything is a meme. ImitaGon, in memeGcs, is
deGned in the broadest sense, "to include passing on infbrmaGon by using language,
reading, and instrucGon, as w ell as other complex skills and behaviors" (Blackmore
22 More correctly, "at least some core components of some memes are reasonable faithfully
reproduced" (Laland and Brown 2002:199). Defining what constitutes an individual meme is one
o f the unsettled analytic issues in memetics. See Blackmore (1999), Dawkins (1976), Dennett
(1995).
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1999:43). What does not count as a meme are behaviors learned throughi condiGoning,
classical or operant; those behaviors that are contagious, hke yawning when others do,
because we already know how to yawn and thus no infbrmaGon aAowt yawning is passed
on in the imitaGon; and speciGc types o f social learning, speciGcally, 'stimulus
enhancement' or 'local enhancement,' in which aGenGon is drawn to the object or locale
by the presence o f another person, but the behavior that is thought to be im itated is
actually independenGy discovered (Blackmore 1999).
MemeGcs is an example o f universal Darwinism. Darwinian evoluGon requires three
processes fbr replicators to undergo: variaGon, selecGon, and retenGon (Blackmore 1999).
Memes confbrm to the mechanism o f biological evoluGon, but operate in a different
medium. There is variaGon (not all memes are ahke), selecGon (some memes do beGer in
the environment than do others), and retenGon (the 'something' that consGtutes a meme is
inhented through im itation).
Thinking about memes is similar to thinking ahout genes. Blackmore (1999, chap. 4)
suggests we take a meme's eye view, much as Dawkins suggested using a gene's eye
view, in order to think about the di%renGal rephcaGon o f memes. Remember that nval
alleles compete, so to speak, for a place in an organism's genome. Genomes are
replicated, and the allele that secured a place on the chromosome get passed on to the
next generaGon. Memes, too, can be avals, but the structure that memes reside in and can
ultim ately contribute to a meme's rephcaGon is the human mind. "Imagine a world fu ll o f
brains, and far more memes than can possibly find homes. Which memes are more hkely
to Gnd a safe home and get passed on again?" (Blackmore 1999:41). This is the central
quesGon o f memeGcs. SuccessGil memes are the ones that the mind selects and is passed
on to another mind through imitaGon.
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A t this point, yon might be asking one o f the more central questions o f memeGcs:
What is it good fbr? Memes are a new concept, and it is sGll unclear whether memetics
win establish itself as a scienGGc discipline. MemeGcs is not yet widely accepted in
academia (Blackmore 1999; DenneG 1995). One o f the champions o f memeGcs, Daniel
DenneG, concedes that "the prospects fbr elaborating a ngorous science o f memeGcs are
doubtfW" (1995:369). Why then should memetics be considered a sociobiological
approach?
One possible answer, which may not be so pleasing to memeGcists, is that memes
really only serve as a useful way o f thinking about evoluGonary psychology. Let us think
about what makes a meme successful. I f our minds are the ultimate natural selector o f
memes, then what makes a successful meme gives us insight in thinking about how our
minds work. "From the perspecGve o f memeGcs, evoluGonary psychology provides a
crucial underpinning. In order to understand why certain memes are posiGvely selected
and others rejected we need to understand the way natural selecGon has molded our brains
fbr the beneGt o f the genes . . . To fully understand human behavior we must consider
both geneGc nnzZ memeGc selecGon" (Blackmore 1999:36, itahcs in original).
MemeGcists also make a grander claim that because culture is socially transmiGed
infbrmation, memeGcs can serve as the most appropriate tool fbr studying culture. Clearly
memes can provide us with a different way o f thinking about culture and cultural
transmission, but whether memeGcs actually provides a superior way o f analyzing culture
remains to be seen. No complete memeGc theory o f culture has been profkred by any
proponents o f memetics. Given that memeGcs is in its infancy and has litGe empirical
work to suppoG it, at this time it would be wise to adopt only a tentaGve consideraGon fbr
memeGcs in biosocial theones.
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Gene-Culture CoevoluGonaiy Theory
"There is only one evoluGonary approach to the study o f human behavior that takes
up the challenge o f understanding genetic and cultural evoluGon simultaneously by
focusing directly on their interacGon" (Laland and Brown 2002:242). This approach is
vanously known as gene-culture coevoluGonary theory, gene-culture theory, or dualinhentance th eo ryT h ese theones seek to uncover how our genes restrict the
development o f culture, and ask how culture evolved and how it affects evoluGon (Laland
and Brown 2002). Gene-culture theory draws heavily Gom popuiaGon genetics and relies
on complex mathemaGcal modeling, two hindrances that prohibit it Gom being widely
used as a sociobiological approach. Nonetheless, an analysis o f the components o f the
theory and its possible uses is necessary to complete the conceptual Gamework o f current
approaches to human behavior in the sociobiology discipline.
The approach o f gene-culture theory has two main proponents and schools o f thought.
The Grst was put Girth by Lumsden and Wilson (1981) in Gewef,

owZ CWfure. The

second approach was advocated by Cavalli-Sfbrza and Feldman (1981) in CwZtwraZ
o/Kf Evo/wGon. These approaches share many similariGes. Each use
concepts that are sim ilar to those used in evoluGonary psychology and memeGcs, and rely
heavily on mathemaGcal models for hypothesis testing. But it is the w ork o f CavahiSforza and Feldman that has been more widely adopted as the theoreGcal fbundaGons fbr
this new Geld, with Lumsden and W ilson's work having been severely cnGcized and then
Gndings oGen refuted by the Cavalli-Sfbrza theories.^ In outlining an analyGc Gamework
o f gene-culture theory, however, it remains useful to draw Gom both approaches.
23 I prefer to use "gene-culture theory" fbr the sake of concision.
24 The criticism came during the height of the sociobiology debate Gom a small group of oAen
partisan reviewers. AddiAonally, the highly technical nature of Lumsden and Wilson's work
hampered attempts at popularizing the theory.
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Gene-culture theory's concept o f culture walks the line between behavior genetics and
cultural constructionism. Much o f what we consider culture changes too rapidly to be the
direct result genes, but conversely, human cultural universals and different cultural
tradidons found in similar environments belie the strict construcGonist argument. Geneculture theory rejects this dualisGc stance and accepts that both "genes and environment
undoubtedly account for some variation in human behaviour but the socially GansmiGed
component o f culture is hard to ignore" (Laland and Brown 2002:245).
CnGcal to gene-culture theory are the concepts o f epigenesis and the epigeneGc rule.
Recall that epigenesis is the process o f gene-environment interacGons that result in the
development o f an organism's phenotype. Lumsden and Wilson (1981) define an
epigeneGc rule as follows:
Any regularity during epigenesis that channels the development of an anatomical,
physiological, cogniGve, or behavioral trait in a particular direction. . . Some
epigenetic mles are inflexible, with the final phenotype being buffered from all but the
most drastic environmental changes. Others permit a Gexible response to the
environment. . . In cogniGve development, the epigeneGc rules are expressed in any
one of the many processes of percepGon and cogniGon to influence the form of learning
and the Gansmission of culturgens. (P. 370)

An epigenetic rule explains the phenotypic result o f a parGcular gene-environment
interaction. How do epigeneGc rules relate to the thesis that genes and culture coevolve?
Lumsden and Wilson Grst o fk r a working deGniGon o f culture: "the sum total o f mental
constructs and behaviors, including the construction and employment o f arti&cts,
GansmiGed Gom one generaGon to the next by social learning" (1981:3). They go on to
deGne a culturgen as any Gansmissible behavior, arGfact, or mental construct. A culturgen
is conceptually sim ilar to a meme, in that they are aGempts to divide culture into discrete
units. Gene-culture coevoluGon is the change in epigeneGc rules due to shifts in gene
Gequency, culturgen Gequency, or both joinüy. Put more simply, the makeup o f the
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human phenotype in a population— ^remembering that phenotype is all the physical
qualihes of an organism, including physiology and behavior at all levels (Lewontin 1992)
— ^isthe result o f the combinaGon of both genes and cultural elements.
Cultural selecGon is the process whereby culturgens increase or decrease in Gequency
within a popuiaGon by being adopted by individuals at diGering rates (Cavalli-Sfbrza and
Feldman 1981; Laland and Brown 2002). Cultural selecGon can guide natural selecGon;
individuals express differing cultural prekrences, and sometimes as a result these cultural
preferences cause individuals to survive and Gourish at different amounts. In this way, the
effects of cultural preference have a geneGc component. The example o f contracepGon is
often used to explain this point. Fertility conGol is disadvantageous fbr genes in terms of
natural selecGon m that pracGGoners typically have kw er oGspring. But contracepGon is
oGen a popular choice, and hence conGacepGon as a culturgen is spread by its advantage
in cultural selecGon. The advantage of gene-culture coevolution is that it can explain how
cultural tradiGons that are non-adaptive in the biological sense can evolve. "When it has a
sufGcienGy high cultural Gtness, cultural infbrmation could increase in Gequency despite
the decreasing geneGc Gtness" (Laland and Brown 2002:251).
Gene-culture theonsts give three reasons why human evoluGon may be difkrent than
other species' evolutions because of our culture. First, as seen in the example of
conGacepGon, culture is an eGecGve means of modi:^ing the course o f natural selecGon.
Second, culture may generate ways to circumvent the regular natural selecGon process,
like in the case where a parGcular cultural group (as opposed to individuals) are
reproducGvely favored. Thud, because culture can affect natural selecGon, the rates of
evoluGonary change can be speeded-up or slowed-down by culture (Laland and Brown

2002).
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Ultim ately, gene-culture theory tends to favor examining how culture affects the
issues o f popuiaGon geneGcs and evoluGon. Cavalli-Sfbrza and Feldman (1981), pioneers
in this approach, use the example o f the development of agriculture to explain:
The dramatic increase in numbers of man with the adoption of agriculture is the most
conspicuous testimonial of how a cultural ad^tation, and hence culture itself, can
promote Darwinian Gtness of a species. There is no doubt that cultural mechanisms can
be powerful adapGve mechanisms that favor survival and ulGmate reproducGon.
Cultural adaptaGon, veiy much like physiological adaptaGon, is the transfbrmaGon of
the behavior of an individual to meet some potential demands or challenges. In the case
o f culture, this occurs through learning by imitaGon, educaGon, or related mechaiGsms
that involve use of the pnor expenence of other individuals. (Pp. 362-3)

Our geneGc makeup, then, is not only the result of natural selecGon. It also bears the
signature o f culture's influence on our geneGc evoluGon and the current geneGc variaGon
among populations.
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CHAPTER 4

BIOSOCIAL THEORY
Biology is the key to human nature, and social scientists cannot afïbrd to ignore its
rapidly Gghtening principles. But the social sciences are potentially far richer in
content. Eventually they will absorb the relevant ideas of biology and go on to beggar
them by comparison. (Wilson 1990:260)

The intent of this research is to outline the various evolutionary approaches to human
behavior and show how they are relevant to the social sciences. It can be argued, on the
one hand, that sociology already adequately incorporates concepts Gom biology into its
analyses. It does so largely by picking and choosing Gom biology only what is
immediately useful, and even then used only when necessary. Sociologist John Kunkel
argues just this posiGon, that "sociologists have recognized and accepted the role o f
biological kctors k r decades, albeit impGciGy . . . we are [not] ignorant of these
biological parameters, but only that they are simply part o f the given Gamework o f human
social life" (Kunkel 1982:283-84).
On the other hand, the laGure by sociology in recognizing the relevance of
evoluGonary biology to its own discipline is evidence that there is still much Gom biology
that sociology is ignorant of. There are at least two important contribuGons Gom the
biological sciences that sociology has been slow or unwühng to accept. The Grst is a
reGitaGon of the belief that human beings are a blank slate. Many sociologists hold on to
the

rnya view of human nature, a view that has been shown to be demonstrably

klse and harmGG. Nonetheless, the belief that humans are bom with no innate cogniGve
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mechanisms is a widespread belief. A modem version o f the

view, one that at

least in language aGempts to distance itself Gom the blank slate doctrine, is that the
human mind is rather is like a general-purpose computer. It comes equipped with the
ability to process information and perform fimcGons, but is "desperately dependent upon
such extrageneGc, outside-the-skin control mechanisms" to shape behavior (Geertz
1973:44). The conclusion Gom these two lines of reasoning is that "human nature is an
empty vessel, waiting to be filled by social processes" (Tooby and Cosmides 1992:29).
Biology does not accept this model o f the human mind. Research in cogniGve science,
neuroscience, geneGcs, and evoluGonary psychology, to name a k w , all posit the
existence o f an innate human nature. In fact, to refute the premises o f strict social
construcGvism,^ Tooby and Cosmides (1992) re kr to the research Gom
cogniGve psychology, evoluGonary biology, artificial intelGgence, developmental
psychology, linguisGcs, and philosophy [that] converge on the same conclusion: A
psychological architecture that consisted of nothing but equipotential, general-purpose,
content-independent, or content-free mechanisms cowZd not
the
tasks the human mind is known to perform or solve the adapGve problems humans
evolved to solve. (P. 34, emphasis added)

Theones o f an iimate, universal human nature are not mere rivals to the blank slate.
They fundamentally conGadict the blank slate doctrine, provide ample evidence why it is
wrong, and o fk r supenor evidence that the mind actually contains a large number of
innate, specialized mechanisms k r cogniGve funcGoning.
Even so, the social construcGvist model is oAen favored because if one assumes a set
o f false beliefs about biology, then strict cultural explanaGons are the only alternative.
The dearth o f knowledge o f biology once again provides the starGng point k r a untenable

25 Tooby and Cosmides (1992) call this the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) and offer a
refutation of its premises in detail.
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posiGon, as evidenced by Gns excerpt Gom a classic treaGse on social construcGvism,
Berger and Lnckmann's

CowinzcGo»

ReaZziy:

The human organism lacks the necessary biological means to provide stability fbr
human conduct. Human existence, if it were thrown back on its organismic resources
by themselves, would be existence in some sort of chaos. Such chaos is, however,
empincally unavailable, even though one may theoreGcaUy conceive of it (1966:52)

Here in one passage we find nearly all the social construcGvist errors about biology.
Human conduct is something wholly distinct Gom biology. In a state of nature, human
existence is chaoGc. Without the stabihty provided by culture, humans are incapable o f
human social conduct. Evidence fbr this position is unavailable but is at least theoreGcaUy
conceivable.
Each of these beliefs has been widely refuted by the scienGGc evidence. H uman
conduct and biology are related, and the development o f culture is a human biological
universal. Social organizaGon is the natural state o f human existence. Human conduct is
mediated by human nature and culture.^'^ One can theoreGcaUy conceive of evidence to
support Berger and Luckmann's grand claims only by being completely ignorant o f the
contradictory scienGGc raGonale and empirical evidence that biology provides.
Even so, assuming that there is no human nature is oGen favored because it is thought
to be poUticaUy liberating. If there is no human nature, individuals can be infinitely
molded as society sees Gt. AU problemaGc aspects o f humanity can be solved through
suGicient socializaGon. The absurdity of this posiGon becomes evident when Thornhill
and Palmer (2000) point out that such a beUeG for example,
implies that women Gnd rape a negative expenence only wAem zAey ore
Ay
zAgzr czz/mrg to/gg/ zAz.; wqy. I f this were true, then stopping rape would not be
necessary in order to solve rape as a social proA/gm. Instead, according to assumpGons
26 In addiGon to the conceptual Gamework of sociobiology provided in this paper, see Brown (1991)
fbr an account of human universals and Pinker (2002) fbr a massive summary of the literature on
human nature.
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of the social science explanaGon of rape, the proAZg/» of rape could be solved simply by
teaching women ± a t rape is a wonderful experience. (P. 152, italics in original)

Proponents of the blank slate oAen hold on to its indefensible empirical position
because o f its perceived poliGcal beneGts. Its impGcaGons may not always be politically
liberating, however. Symons notes that "a tabula rasa view o f the human mind is the
totahtarian's dream" (1979:65), and Mao Zedong wrote that "it is on a blank page that the
most beautiful poems are wnGen" (Pinker 2002:11). The policy impGcaGons o f an innate
human nature or of the blank slate doctrine are not as clear-cut as their proponents would
like us to beheve.
Sociology has also been slow to accept a second important contribuGon Gom the
biological sciences: evoluGonary theory. Much o f sociological theorizing denies that
biological factors inGuence behavior and are unaware o f how evoluGon shaped these
factors. Because of this, sociology is handicapped in its efforts to explain human
behavior. The research of this paper suggests some of the ways that biological disciplines
have made inroads into domains tradiGonaUy associated with sociological analysis.
In 1977, the sociologist Gerhard Lenski prescienGy asked, "Why cannot cultural and
biological explanaGons o f human social behavior be combined?' (p. 74). A biosocial
approach aims at just such a goal. It involves incorporating the relevant data and concepts
Gom the biological sciences into the sociological way o f understanding human social
behavior (Walsh 2003). I want to reiterate the distincGon between biological perspecGves,
like the sociobiological approaches outlined in the previous chapter, and biosocial
perspecGves. The intent of the research is different between the two disciplines.
"Sociobiology is concerned largely with interpreting behavior in ultimate terms" (Barash
1982:29). Biosocial theones recognize that because behavior is "the continuous, mutual.
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and inseparable interaction between biology and the social environment" (Lancaster et al.
1987:2), ihe most empirically adequate theories must integrate the relevant insights 6om
natural and social science disciplines.
What are the characteristics o f a biosocial theory? Baldwin and Baldwin (1981) give
four criteria that must be met. The first is that a biosocial theory must "contain an
empirically defensible mixture and interaction o f genetic and environmental factors" (p.
17)— ^that is, not :&vor nature or nurture exclusively. As I w ill explain, sociobiological
approaches are unwittingly biased toward nature because o f misconceptions about what
constitutes the social environment Second, "biosocial theory wiU necessarily involve
multicausal models of behavior, with room for interaction efkcts among the numerous
causes" (p. 17). Third, the influence of genetic and environmental factors must be
weighted according to the species under consideration. For humans, much of our social
behavior is the result o f learning; consequently, the influence o f the environment
(including the complex social environment) must be weighted heavily in biosocial
research. Finally, we must recognize that the influence o f proximate and ultimate causes
o f behavior vary over the course o f the life-span (spanning 6om prenatal development
until death) and thus our explanations must vary accordingly.
None o f this is meant to imply that culture is merely biology writ large (Barkow
1989). Biology underlies psychology, and psychology underlies sociology. Nonetheless
cultural experience accounts for a large portion o f the variance in behavioral differences
within and between cultures (Walsh 1995). A biosocial approach is amenable to the broad
diversity o f Victors that influence social behavior. A biosocial theory, then, "should
provide an empirically defensible interweaving o f multiple causal factors— involving
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both nature and nurture" (Baldwin and Baldwin 1981:16).^^ The discipline o f sociology
rightly is broader than the narrow wety in which it is currently practiced. "To understand
any particular thing in human behavior, social organization, or culture, we need to bring
to bear the insights provided by a variety o f other disciplines" (Cronk 1999:45).

Why Context Matters
"From one perspective," Buss tells us, "context is everything" (1994:15). The context
o f our evolutionary ancestors sh^ed our phenotypic adaptations, but it is in our current
context that we live today. Understanding our current context is critical in understanding
how our evolved phenotypes currently function. "It is realized that even a complete
description and understanding o f the genetic, hormonal, and neurological bases of
complex behavior would not constitute a complete understanding o f that behavior absent
knowledge of cultural setting and of motives, purposes, and phenomenology of the
individual actor" (Walsh 1995:8).
One weakness in sociobiological approaches is how they conceptualize contextual
factors. While they are ready to concede that humans are sensitive to context and acutely
aware of changes in contextual factors (Buss 1994; Pinker 1997; Symons 1979), because
their data collection methods are not always suited to capturing contextual detail, often
sociobiology research paints contextual factors with a broad stroke. Indeed, o f all the
ways o f studying context by sociobiologists, ethnographic data are perhaps the best, and
27 Baldwin and Baldwin call this a balanced biosocial theory. Their work does not focus solely on
human social behavior, but rather is broader in scope and can be "adjusted to St the species and
behavior under analysis" (1981:16). In their opinion, evolutionary biologists had been favoring
genetic factors in their explanations. Adding the descriptor 'balanced' to the label 'biosocial' is a
call for researchers to consider a fairer mixture of both genetic and environmental factors. In the
case of the social sciences, the label seems to be redundant. No discipline advocates abandoning
research on environmental factors. Any serious biosocial approach to human behavior should seek
to incorporate relevant concepts from both natural and social science disciplines. In this case,
'balance' will be a characteristic of these ^proaches, and consequently the label can be omitted.
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even then ethnographers often & il apprehend the relevant contextual fiactors because of
the difGculty o f their work. Mathematical modeling of behavior, as an alternative
approach, reduces contextual factors to attribute variables; the development o f
interactionist sociology was, in many respects, a response to the inability for statistical
analysis or mathematical modeling to capture important characteristics o f context. It
would be unwise if our attempt to forge a better way o f understanding our behavior
required us to take two steps back. Another approach is to use experimental control on
contextual factors. While this may yield information about evolved responses to factors in
a controlled context, we must then rely on comparative methods to attempt to determine
if these responses actually occur during interactions in the day-to-day lived world.
What we need is a way o f integrating approaches so that explanations take into
account the contextual factors of behavior in sifw. Such a limitation of contemporary
sociobiological approaches is recognized by many researchers, who, for example, hold
out that future studies w ill show "that we have evolved psychological mechanisms
sensitive to contexts as yet not envisioned" (Buss 1997:193). This context may be out of
the methodological grasp o f sociobiological researchers, but the tool o f interactionist
sociology can open sociobiology up to a world not yet envisioned.

The Sociological Connection
The logic o f incorporating biology to the study o f human social organization is clear.
Rather than relying solely on social science explanations, a biosocial approach can
"account k r many of the known facts in a more convincing manner than do previous
attempts but should also identify the need for new kinds of information not
conceptualized by the unaided social sciences" (Wilson 1978:4) This also holds true in
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the reverse direction; incoporating social sciences to the study of biology has its
advantages as well. Interactionist sociology can provide a new kind o f information about
context, motivation, and meaning that is not conceptualized by the unaided biological
sciences. Indeed, the benefits of a biosocial approach have long been recognized by some
in sociology:
What is needed is not a life-death struggle between sociology and sociobiology, but two
disciplines that can begin to communicate and cooperate with one another and develop
more sophisticated models of human societies and individual behavior than either alone
could create. (Lenski 1977:75)

Sociologists have more recently begun to promote the advantages to sociology o f such
a synthesis (Freese, AUen Li, and Wade 2003; Udry 1995). I wish to reiterate some of
these advantages and suggest a few additional ways that a biosocial approach can be
benehcial. The first, and most obvious, is that biosocial models can be more successfiil
than models that rely on only biological or social factors. Evidence o f this can be fbimd in
Udry (1988), who predicts adolescent sexuality using a biosocial model that turns out to
be a significant improvement on its component biological and sociological models.
A second use o f a biosocial ^proach is to revitalize rational-choice theories
(Kanazawa 2001 ; Nesse 2001). By providing a definition of rationality that is satisfactory
to the findings h"om biological research, rational-choice theories can escape the problem
o f stretching the notion of rationahty too far and begin to provide a useful method for
explaining social behavior. Especially relevant to this project are evolutionary psychology
and memetics; the more we understand about how individuals make choices, assess
contextual factors, and assign value to actions, the better a rational-choice theory w ill be
able to explain and predict behavior.
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An evolütionarily-informed rational-choice theory would present a novel approach to
studying institutions and affecting their organization through policy recommendations.
This is a way for rational-choice theory to applies to the real world (Gigerenzer 2000).
MindAd use o f game theory in our policies can be a way to effect institutional change by
creating institutional rules where it is more beneAcial to play by the rules than to violate
them. The Superfund can be thought of as an example o f this; it is an attempt to inflict
greater costs to those responsible for contamination and pollution than the beneAts (in
terms o f cost-cutting) that polluAng would normally have. The U.S. ConsAtuAon is
another example; the separation o f powers provides each branch o f the government with
ways to Aght o ff encroachment by the other two branches to prevent concentraAon of
power. SeparaAon o f powers, by its design, protects Aeedom and poliAcal process at the
cost o f eAiciency.
InsAtuAons operate on both micro and macro levels of analyses, internally and
externally, in terms of the funcAoning of an insAtuAon vis-a-vis its consAtuent members,
individuals it serves, its overall internal structure, and its relaAonship and interacAon with
other insAtuAons. In any of these four areas, the way the insAtuAon funcAons can be
modiAed by an applicaAon of the insights o f raAonal-choice theory and game theory. On
the micro-level o f analysis— the relaAonship between insAtuAons and individuals—
raAonal-choice theory can be thought of as an analysis o f insAtuAons and bureaucracy, in
the tradiAon of Weber and Blau. On the macro-level o f analysis— an insAtuAon's
structure and relaAonship to other insAtuAons within society— game theory can offer
unexpected insights into how insAtuAons funcAon and interrelate.
Perhaps the most signiAcant avenue for a biosocial approach is its potenAal
contribuAons to the interacAonist school o f sociology. InteracAonist sociology is a tool
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par exceZZence for studying particular types of social phenomena: the meaning that
individuals attribute to interacAons and social behavior; the way in which individuals
learn and use symbolic media; the moAvaAons and intenAons o f individuals; the ways in
which individuals provide interpretations o f social interacAons; and the ways in which the
interpreAve process is culture-bound, or more speciAcally, context-bound. By drawing
hom biology— including sources like evoluAonary psychology, behavioral ecology, and
neurophysiology— interacAonist theory can improve by acquiring a crucial component
that had been missing. That component is the scienAGc knowledge of human nature. With
this knowledge, it can begin to advance explanaAons tor why behavior varies by context,
for why individuals assign parAcular meanings to behaviors, for why individuals have the
moAvaAons and intenAons that they do. By accepting that biology plays a part in shaping
social interacAon and in how individuals assign meaning to those interacAons, we can
begin to suggest the contextual features that are important to look for and the reasons why
contextual variaAon maAers so greatly. EvoluAonary psychology suggests the critena for
determining what contextual factors are important to human behavior. We can reposiAon
interacAonist sociology to explain interpretaAon and meaning by understanding the
underlying &ctors that humans have evolved to be sensiAve to. This is not to say
interacAonist sociology should abandon its research programme; no, it should expand by
incorporating the relevant insights Aom biology, and coimect with the attempts by
biology to understand context and meaning.
Furthermore, a biologically-informed interacAonist sociology would be a usefiil
starting point for theones of the middle ground, or connecting together the various
sociological levels of analysis. Just as interacAonism can bring the insights o f biology to
aid its inquiry, sociological analysis that focuses on higher-level organizaAon and the
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structure o f society can incorporate the insights of interacAonist sociology. Because a
biosocial interacAonist approach can propose and test hypotheses about how context
affects subjecAve interpretaAons, it would Aee interacAonist sociology Aom offering
descripAve analysis that is necessarily context-bound.
There is one more advantage o f a biosocial approach to studying human behavior. It
would provide the most empincally adequate exqxlanaAon &*r social phenomena. I f we
desAe to not only know the world, but to change it, then being aware of its true and
mulAple causes is the Arst step toward implementing policies meant to implement change
to existing social relaAons. Research in the area o f biosocial theones has only recenAy
begun, and down that path lies the promise o f a new way to better understanding human
behavior.
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